A reform strategy in urban education : community action and education in New Haven, Connecticut, 1962-1972. by Peel, Mark Steven
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1973
A reform strategy in urban education : community
action and education in New Haven, Connecticut,
1962-1972.
Mark Steven Peel
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peel, Mark Steven, "A reform strategy in urban education : community action and education in New Haven, Connecticut, 1962-1972."
(1973). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2712.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2712

A REFORM STRATEGY IN URBAN EDUCATION:
COMMUNITY ACTION AND EDUCATION IN
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, 1962-1972
A Dissertation Presented
by
MARK STEVEN PEEL
B.A. University of Connecticut
M.S. Southern Connecticut State College
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
February
( Month
)
1973
(Year)
Major Subject: Urban Education
A REFORM STRATEGY IN URBAN EDUCATION
COI#TUNITY ACTION AND EDUCATION IN
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, 1962-1972
A Dissertation
ty
Mark Steven Peel
Approved as to style and content by:
—
Dr. OjLeo Abraham, Committee Chairman
/ y <
Dr.' Dwight W. Allen, Head of Departmen-b
o
Dr. Patrick Syulivan, Member
\/JM
Dr. Thomas Vitelli, Member
(c) Mark Steven Peel 1973
All Rights Reserved
For Florence, my mother; Sharon, my wife
and Cleo, my brother
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Few people can fully understand my debt to Dr. Cleo
Abraliam, Associate Director of the Center for Urban Educa-
"tion. Let it suffice here to say that his endless encour-
agement, assistance, and advice are most responsible for
this achievement. I am most grateful to Dr. Byrd L. Jones,
Director of the Center for Urban Education; Dr. Bob H.
Suzuki, Assistant Dean; and Dr. Patrick Sullivan, Director
of the Media Center for their critical attention to this
dissertation and my work during the last two years. To Dr.
Thomas Vitelli, Dean of Students, Southern Connecticut State
College, I owe a special debt of gratitude for his personal
interest and guidance over many years. I would also like to
thank Dr. Atron A. Gentry, Assistant Dean, a man who shows
his concern in many ways.
Others contributed specifically to the conduct of this
study. In New Haven, I received invaluable help from Ralph
Goglia, Special Assistant to the Superintendent and Dr.
George Harris, Assistant Superintendent of Schools. At Comr-
munity Progress, Incorporated, Joseph Do\iney, Director of
Operations and Sandy Ressler, Deputy Director opened many
doors. Elsewhere Vincent Pitts and Brian David Peel pro-
vided the necessary inspiration in addition to other as-
sistance. I thank them all.
A great measure of gratitude must go to my fellow gradu-
^ ate students and the staff at the Center for Urban Education,
both past and present, for their constant support and friend-
Vship. Regretfully they are too numerous to mention indi-
vidually
,
lastly I and surely not least of all, I am forever in-
debted to my vrife Sharon who was there throughout.
II
... we do not possess adequate descriptions
of the change process so as to allow us to
begin to understand the high frequency of
failure or the occasional successes."
Seymour B. Sarason
The Culture of the School
and the Problem of Change
( 1971 )
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.... iv
LIST OF TABLES V
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER
I EDUCATION AND POVERTY IN NEW HAVEN
IN 1962 5
The State of Poverty 5
The State of Education 1
4
II THE COI^IMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM AGENCY
AND THE NEW HAVEN SCHOOL SYSTEM 23
The Formative Phase 1961-1962 26
The Peak Phase 1963-1965 32
The Transitional Phase 1966-1969 45
The Terminal Phase 1970-1972 59
III THE EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISES OF
A COALITION REFORD'I STRATEGY 62
The Formative Phase 1961-1962 63
The Peak Phase 1963-1965 66
The Transitional Phase 1966-1969 77
The Terminal Phase 1970-1972 80
IV COMMUNITY ACTION VEHICLES FOR
RESIDENT PARTICIPATION IN
EDUCATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 84
Community Action Vehicles and
Community Progress, Incorporated 87
Community Action Vehicles and
The Board of Education 97
TABLE OP CONTENTS (Cont’d)
V A COALITION REFORM STRATEGY IN
URBAN EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS 107
Soni6 Addiiiioiial Rsform PspspGcfcives 107
Coalition Reform in New Haven
Political Rhymes and Reasons 120
Community Action Vehicles: Reexamined
and Defined 24
Goals, Scale and the Siun of
Educational Enterprises 126
Implications for the Future I3I
BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX
VLIST OP TABLES
Table
Page
1:1 New Haven Popiolation by National
Origin, I960
.
. 7
1 :2 New Haven Population, Total and
Black, 1950, 1960, 1970
. . 8
1:3 Poverty Indices for Inner-city
Neighborhoods. 1962
. . 11
1:4 New Haven Public Schools, Professional
Staff by Sex and Education, 1947, 1962,
1972
. . 17
2:1 Community Action Program Staff, Total
and Indigenous by Employee Category. . . ,
.
. 33
2:2 Community Action Funding, Peak Phase,
1963-1965
.
. 35
2:3 Allocation of Funds by Program Area,
1962-1965
.
. 37
2:4 Racial Distribution of Pupils in New
Haven Elementary Schools, November 1963. . .
,
. 40
2:5 Racial Distribution of Pupils in New
Haven Junior and Senior High Schools,
November 1963
2:6 Median Years of Experience of Professional
Personnel, New Haven Public Schools, October
1960-1971
. . 57
2:7 Leaves of Absence, Resignations, and
Retirements of Professional Staff, 1964-1971 . . 58
2:8 Resignations from Active Service in New
Haven by Length of Resignee Service
1964-1971
3:1 Student Dropout Rates by Grades, Nevr
Haven Public School System, 1962-1963. . . . . . 75
4:1 First Resident Advisory Committee (1965)
by Neighborhood and Occupation
5:1 Political Parity and Coalition Reform, . , . . . 122
LIST OP ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
3:1 The Community Progress, Inc .-Community
School Relationship
3:2 Administrative Organization of the
Community School Program,
4:1 The Neighborhood Corporation
5:1 Three Community Action Reform Strategi
5:2 Institutional Change Processes of
Community Progress, Inc. and the New
Haven School System
1INTRODUCTION
Public opinion today has come to accept as sixiomatic the
assertion that urban education in America has failed. Recent
professional literature and extensive supporting studies have
advanced enough persuasive documentation and credible opinion
to convince the educator and befuddle the apprehensive layman.
With the exception of several under-publicized, isolated suc-
cesses, the conclusion, albeit relative, is generally accu-
rate.
Changing the established performance record of urban
schools is technically the exclusive responsibility of the
formal education establishment for which urban taxpayers con-
tribute the largest share of each municipal budget.^ In
reality, responsibility also lies with a more accountable so-
cial order, najnely, the local government of elected and ap-
pointed officials which maintains the educational system, and
ultimately, with the community which uses and supports it.
Traditionally, urban school systems have resisted both change
and accountability and, in fact, have abrogated that respon-
See Atron A. G-entry, et Urban Education; The Hone
Factor (Philadelphia: Saun'Sers, 1972), Chapter 3.
^Report of the Commissioner's Ad Hoc Group on School
Finance (HEW) , Part 16D-3- Inequality in School Finance:
G-eneral Appendices, Hearings before the Select Committee
on Ea^ual Educational Opportunity (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1971), p. 8370.
2sibility in favor of the status quo,^ Recent research further
indicates that "improvement in student outcomes, both cogni-
tive and noncognitive, may require sweeping changes in the or-
ganization, structure, and conduct of educational experience,"
but also that "innovation, responsiveness, and adaptation in
school systems decrease with size (of school systems) and de-
pend upon exogenous shocks to the system."^ (Emphasis added.)
The clear implication is that institutional reform, including
more substantial segmental changes than periodic curriculum
revisions or occasional demonstration projects, is required.
Janowitz suggests that some consequences of segmental change
have worked, in fact, to the disadvantage of urban schools,
and concludes that "inner-city school systems do not have the
capacity to plan or launch comprehensive change to deal with
any particular problem or student population."^
Reform is not new to the American city. Almost without
exception, cities have had to endure the trauma of corrup-
tion, scandal, and eventually change throughout the process of
urbanization. Though corruption in the strict criminal sense
Designing Education for the Future Ro . 3 : Planning
and Effecting Heeded Changes in Education , Edgar L. Morphet
and Charles 0. Ryan (eds.j (New York: Citation Press, 1967)f
p. 184.
Garvey A. Averch, et al.. How Effective is Schooling?
A Critical Review and Synthesis of Research Findings , R-99^-
PCSF/RC (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation,
1972), pp. 156-58.
^Morris Janowitz, Institution Building in Urb^ Educa-
tion (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 19b9),
p. 116.
3need not be characteristic of the need for all reform, stag-
nation and misuse of institutions may well represent the most
dominant, causative pressures for contemporary reform since
the bossism and unscrupulous municipal patronage of the late
19th and early 20th centuries. The pernicious effects of
kickbacks, bribery, and graft in the past are now achieved by
the entrenched, unresponsive bureaucracies, routine, imper-
sonal procedures, and distorted priorities of many public in-
stitutions, The indictment of urban educational institutions
is staggering in this regard.
In the early 1960’s when most American cities were well
steeped in physical rebuilding programs made possible by Fed-
eral legislation, several cities recognized the deepening
tragedy of human conditions for the poor and minorities. So-
cial planners of the most diverse backgrounds undertook the
task of reforming urban institutions to meet the public’s
c
A representative list for referencing might include:
James Conant, Slums and Suburbs (New York: The American
Library, Signet Books, 1961); Charles Silberman, Crisis in
the Classroom (New York: Random House, 1970); The Urban
Education Task Force Report: Final Report of the Task Force
on Urban Education to the Deoar-bment of Health, Education7
and Welfare
,
V/ilson Riles, chairman (New York: Praeger,
1 ^70 ) ; Paul Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education (New York:
Horizons Books, 1964)1 Jonathan Kozol, Death at an Early Age
(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co,, 1967); John Holt, How
Children Fail (New York: Pitman Publishing Co,, 1 %4)
;
Atron A, Gentry, et al,, Urban Education: The Hope Factor
(Philadelphia: Saunders, 1972): Peter Schrag, Village School
Do;mtovm. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); David Rogers, iTa
Livings"bon Street (New York: Random House, Vintage, 1969)
»
Neil Postman and~Charles V/iengarten, Teachnng as a Subversive
Activity (New York: Delacorte Press, 19^9),
4needs. Assuming that local institutions, if redirected and
coordinated, could do much more (and better) than previously
demonstrated, planners identified the role of educational in-
stitutions as integral and paramount in this task. At the
same time, it was evident that these very institutions were
equally culpable in perpetuating the root causes and results
of poverty, discrimination, and disadvantage. If educational
institutions were to perform a new leading function in human
renewal, they too would have to undergo reform.
This study describes and analyzes the efforts of one
city ~ New Haven, Connecticut ~ to reform and revitalize
its school system through community action. It is a story
of change and the strategy which facilitated it.
5CHAPTER I
EDUCATION AlTD POVERTY IN NEW HAVEN IN 1-^62
The State of Poverty
New Haven is a New England harbor city nestled between
tv7o small mountains (East and V/est Rock) on the Connecticut
shoreline and the coastal v^aters of Long Island Sound, Set-
tled by members of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in April,
1638, the town was initially a church-state which prospered
through amiable relations with the local Indians and suc-
cessful agricultural, trade, and shipping ventures. Histor-
ically, the city is most noted as the co-capital of Connecti-
cut for 172 years (1701-1873) and as the seat of Yale Univer-
sity (t701).
For almost two centuries New Haven’s population was
mainly of English descent with a miniscule number of other na-
1tionalities. In the course of the nineteenth century, as waves
of Europeans emigrated, the city svxelled with newcomers, first
of Irish and German stock, and later Italians and East Europeans.
The process of assimilation had taken hold by the time of the
I960 census when only forty-two percent of the city’s popu-
lation, for one reason or other, identified themselves
^ See Rollin Osterweis' Three Centuries of New Haven,
1 638-1 938 (Nev7 Haven: Yale University Press, 1953) for
an extended historical treatment of Nev7 Haven’s ethnic
populations
.
6by foreign-national origins (See Table 1:1).^
The period of New Haven's history germane to this study
begins in the early 1960s. At that time New Haven was in the
midst of change. The population was changing in composition,
a factor holding critical political and economic implications.
The skyline was changing; urban renewal and redevelopment
were finally making an obvious, physical impact on the city.
Latent social consciousness had reached a threshold level of
new commitment and activity; numerous social factors, sym-
bolized by the city's many new buildings within sight of its
ghettoes, were warning those in power to take heed and ac-
tion. The human condition of New Haven's populace offered
the real statement of historical significance. Like most ur-
ban areas in 1962, New Haven V7as suffering from an accumula-
tion of nev7ly recognized negative socio-economic forces.
Most illustrative of these factors was the changing demo-
graphic patterns which showed a decline of 164,000 to 152,000
in total population for New Haven in the period 1950 to I960.
(See Table 1:2) Even more significant is the shifting compo-
sition of the city's population. Although there had been
large percentages of foreign stock residents in the city of
New Haven throughout its history, the 1950's saw a drastic
influx of Southern rural blacks and the start of an emigration
^Robert A. Dahl's Who G-overns? Democracy and Power in
an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961)
is a classic analysis of New Haven's ethnic populations and
their impact on the political system.
7TABLE 1 ;
1
NEW HAVEN POPULATION
BY NATIONAL ORIGIN
I960
25,151 Italians 1 ,008 Austrian
8,124 Russians 782 Swedish
6,909 Irish 618 Hungarian
5,405 Polish 290 Czechoslovakian
3,257 German 1 58 Norwegian
3,249 United Kingdom 60 Mexican
2,670 Canadian 6,430 All others not
64,111 Total foreign stock *
By Racial Origin
I960
129,583 White
22,113 Negro
552 Other races
152,048
Source: U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing, I960.
*Foreign stock is defined as foreign-hom, or native-Lom
of foreign or mixed parentage.
TABLE 1 :
2
imi HAVEN POPULATION, TOTAL AND BLACK
1950, I960, 1970
Census Total
Population
Black
Population
1950 164,443 5.8
I960 152,648 14.5
1970 137,707 26.3
Total
Population
New Haven
SMSA*
New Haven
City-
New Haven SMSA
excluding New
Haven City
I 960 320,836 152,648 168,788
1970 355,538 137,707 217,831
Per Cent
Black
I960 7.5 14.5 1 .2
1970 11 .6 26.3 2.3
New Haven SMSA includes the city of New Haven plus Branford
East Haven, Guilford, Hamden, North Haven, Orange, West
Haven, V/oodhridge.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census
9by white ethnics. In 1950 blacks comprised approximately 5.8
percent of the total New Haven popnlation; by I960 the figure
had climbed to 14.5 percent. The emerging pattern was one of
a declining total population and a rapidly increasing black
population.^ City planners in the mid-1960*s predicted a con-
tiniial influx of unskilled blacks into the city for the next
ten years resulting in projected population of thirty to
forty percent by 1980.^ The 1970 census showed more than
twenty-six percent of New Haven as being black.
The traditional indices which are used to illustrate the
existence of poverty are perhaps never adequate in meeting
the task. To the extent possible, one must attempt to gain
an understanding or feeling of the "poverty of spirit" which
accompanies or results from the poverty of the body. In 1962
New Haven’s inner-city neighborhoods were steeped in both.
The inner-city of Nevj Haven is composed of six identifi-
able neighborhoods — the Hill, Nevrhallville, Dwight, Fair
Haven, Wooster Square, and Dixwell. In I960, these areas in-
cluded 83,000 people or fifty-five percent of the city’s
population living on only thirty percent of the city’s total
area. Residents of these neighborhoods are represented quite
heavily in the poverty data available for this time period.
^Community Progress, Inc., "An Application for Financial
Assistance Under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964", New
Haven, Connecticut, October 2, 1964. (Mimeographed), p. 1.
^Community Progress, Inc., New Haven Youth Development
ProgrpTn, Part One: The Setting^ ^New Haven, Connecticut ,
October, 1963, P.
10
(See Table 1:3). While U.5 percent of New Haven's popula-
tion in I960 was nonwhite, in these neighborhoods it was
twenty-three percent. One out of every three inner-city
families had incomes of less than ^4,000 per year. Almost
10.000 families or 22.9 percent of the families in the city
earned less than $4»000 annually. The rate of juvenile court
referrals per 1,000 youths, ages seven to fifteen, was 35.3
from these neighborhoods as compared with 16.5 in the rest of
the city. The infant mortality rate was as high as 70.8 per
1.000 births in one neighborhood, but well above the city
(28.0) and national averages (26.0) in all of the inner-city
neighborhoods combined.
Data on employment and education further defined the
tangible and intangible parameters of poverty in the city.
\fhlle the unemployment rate for the city as a whole was 5.6
percent at this time, unemployment in the inner-city averaged
7.2 percent but climbed as high as ten percent in two neigh-
borhoods. Nearly three-fourths of the families receiving
public welfare assistence lived in the inner-city neighbor-
hoods. Almost half of the adult population of the same areas
had an eighth grade education or less compared to 45.5 per-
cent of the adult population of the entire city. In round
figures, almost 40,000 adults in New Haven had no more than
an eighth grade education in 1962.^ Each statistic adds to
^U.S. Conference of I4ayors, "Community Action in New
Haven," Experience Report 104, Education Services, March,
1965, p. 5.
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the huinan portrait of deprivation.
By the early 1960’s, Nevf Haven had achieved a national
reputation as a model city through its efforts in urban re-
newal and redevelopment. This achievement had dubious re-
sults, however, for the inner-city poor. In the first half-
dozen years of redevelopment, the major beneficiaries of New
Haven’s model city status were business and industry. While
the city’s publicity alluded to efforts currently under plan-
ning, construction, or completion, its face-lifting had either
dislocated the inner-city poor or completely circumvented
them. Urban renewal was something to be read about in the
newspapers or, worse yet, in notification papers to move
elsewhere so that an office building or shopping center could
be built in place of a home. The 500 units of low income
public housing on the drawing boards in 1961 were hardly pro-
portional to the actual needs of the city’s residents.
New Haven’s reputation as a model city, however, was not
A city publication. New Haven Development duide 1961 «
asserts that by that year <560 million had been spent on new
construction provided nearly 1,500 jobs for the construction
trade. Almost 2,500 families were removed from renevral areas
for the construction of a television studio, a shopping
plaza, a telephone company office building, and a high rise,
luxury apartment building. Citing the construction of over
700 units of moderate rental housing (387 additional units
planned)
,
the report neglects to mention that some 40^ of
the dwellings in the inner-city vzere substandard and untouched
by redevelopment.
13
wholly imeamed. More than one writer has graciously granted
this.'^ Inevitably, the city’s initial preoccupation with its
economic base served to emphasize its "benign neglect" of its
resident poor. It took Mayor Richard C, Lee to admit pub-
licly what had become privately apparent to most city offi-
cials. In a speech for the Norfolk, Virginia Chamber of Comr-
merce in December 1962, the Mayor went on record:
It does not take a city planner’s education or a
blackboard of statistics to shovr that our cities are
in trouble. It can become quite apparent to any con-
cerned citizen who would but take an afternoon’s walk
through his ovm city.
At first glance he will certainly see the facades
of our contemporary office buildings, the concrete
ribbons of our interstate highways, and the glitter
and excitement of Main Street. But let him look
closer in the shadows down the streets.
And if he will look carefully, he will see another
and even more serious dimension to the urban crisis —
he will see it in most city neighborhoods, on the
garbage-stream streets and alleys, and on the faces
of the men, the women, and the children who during
their entire lives have knovm nothing but misery and
despair.
He will see, in effect, that the haphazard growth
of our cities and the years of neglect and lack of
comprehensive planning have resulted not only in
physical ugliness, chaos, and decay; they have also
produced the terrible byproduct of human waste and
suffering.
In admitting the need for national recognition and comr-
mitment to human renewal, Lee was duplicating his previous
coup which had resulted in New Haven’s redevelopment program.
^Varied plaudits can be found in:
Fred Powledge, Model City: A Test of American Liberalism:
One Team’s Efforts to Rebuild Itself (New York: Simon and
yjilliam Miller. 'iTie Fifteenth Ward and the
Great Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co , , 1 966 ) ; Allan
Talboir'riiFMayor’s Game: Richard Lee of New Haven and the
Politics of Change (New York: Harper and Row, PublishBrs
,
Inc., 196V).
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Lee was convinced that New Haven’s preparations in the pre-
ceeding months had brought the city to a major confrontation
with the human needs of its residents. The effort to deal
V7ith these needs had to commence with an extensive reevalua-
tion of New Haven's public school system. The educative
process was to serve as a crux for social concern and action
in the coming decade.
The State of Education
New Haven has undertaken on several occasions during the
last twenty—five years serious and extensive attempts to eval-
uate its school system in part or whole.® The need for peri-
odic examinations of the school system stems from a variety
of organizational and socio-economic factors. Certainly the
importance of education in American society and the immedi-
ate role it plays in municipalities like New Haven as the
largest single budget expense are compelling factors. An-
other is the recognition that public education must con-
stantly stay abreast of changing societal needs and adapt it-
self to meet them. For purposes of analysis a short digres-
sion to examine the first of two comprehensive system evalua-
®The major studies are: Julian Butterworth, New Haven’s
Schools: An Investment in Your City's !^ture , 1 947 ; Cyril
Sargent. New Schools for New Haven/ 1 961 ; F^^cation Task
Force, A. Blueprint for Better Bducation in New Haven , 1961;
Arthur D. Litxle. The Administrative Organiza-bion of the
School System of New Haven. Connecticut . 1961; John Price,
A Report of the Organization and Administrative Functioning
of the New Haven Public School System. 1 967
.
15
tion’s in New Haven’s recent history may be worthwhile.
Shortly after the end of World War II, suggestions for
a study of the school system were made to the school board
from various segments of the community. In the immediate
post-war period, the city had time to be concerned about edu-
cation, something that had not been possible during the de-
pression or in war-time. Accumulated community pressure
broiight upon the Board of Finance and the Board of Education
resulted in a S45,000 appropriation in April, 1946 for such a
study. Professor Julian E. Butterworth of Cornell University
was engaged by the Board of Education to direct the study.
The completed study, submitted on June 15, 1947, made
six recommendations to the Board of Education;
1 . The Department of Education should be given
status independent of city government in order
that there be no suspicion that political in-
fluences are determining educational policies.
2. A more effective professional leadership
should be developed. This need may be met by
an increase in the personnel of the central
staff, by a more effective organization of the
various divisions of the staff, by a more
definite allocation of responsibility, and by
the use of more democratic procedures.
3. The residency requirement for professional
employees of the school system should be elim-
inated.
4. Additional funds should be made available
in almost every phase of the program.
5. An improved salary schedule for employees
of the school system should be adopted at once.
6. As soon as building prices appear to be some-
what stabilized, an extensive program of rebuild-
16
ing and remodeling should he begun. ^
Using the Butterworth survey to gain a perspective of
segmental progress in the school system, some measure of
change dictated by social circumstances and events can be as-
certained. For example, the typical teacher in the New Haven
school system in 1 946 was female and about forty—five years
old. She was bom in New Haven and attended local schools.
After graduation from high school, she took her professional
training at New Haven State Teacher’s College, graduating in
1922 from the two year course. Immediately upon graduation
she entered the local system without teaching experience
elsewhere. She continued to take courses and typically
secin'ed a baccalaureate degree in 1941 after almost twenty
1
0
years teaching. Table 1:4 provides a broader statistical
indication of change in the professional staff from this
period through that concerned by this study, a span of
twenty-five years.
In 1961 as part of a multi-faceted, preliminary approach
to systematic human renewal, the Board of Education sponsored
three individual studies which focused on the major areas of
facilities, administration, and curriculum. Unlike the com-
prehensive Butterworth survey, these studies were implemented
separately by a Harvard professor, a professional consulting
firm, and a team of local professional educators.
^Butterworth
,
p . 4
.
10Butterworth, p. 33.
TABLE 1 :4
NEW HAVEN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
PROFESSIONAL STAFF
BY SEX AND EDUCATION
1947, 1962, 1972
1947 (a) 1962 (b) 1972
% Male 19 30 40
“fo Female 81 70 60
fo Under
Four Years 50 14 1
io BA 56 42 57
9^ MA or
Better 14 44 42
Total
Professional
Staff 955 1004 1488
Total
Enrollment 21 ,112 20,917 21 ,000
Sources
:
(a) Julian Butterworth, New Haven's Schools; An
Investment in Your Ci'^y’s Fut-ure « New Haven,
Connecticut, 1947.
(b) (o) New Haven Public Schools, Personnel Report
of Professional Staff 1971-72, November, 1971.
18
The first study conducted was that on facilities. Dr.
Cyril Sargent of the Harvard Graduate School of Education was
hired by the Board to investigate thoroughly the adequacy of
New Haven’s educational facilities and to recommend measures
to meet present and immediate future needs of the school sys-
tem, Sargent and his staff set about the survey using the
following evaluative criteria: 1) educational suitability of
facilities, 2) age of school, 3) degree of deterioration,
4) location of schools in relation to population, 5) size of
building, and 6) fire safety.
The Sargent study noted several other factors which had
to be considered as well. It found, as the Butterworth re-
port had forecast, that the absolute total population of New
Haven was declining, falling from 164,443 in 1950 to 152,048
in I960. The total school enrollment, hovrever, remained
fairly stable (20,234 in 1950; 21,028 in I960). This indi-
cated an increase in the ratio of school children to the
1 2total population, a trend it predicted to continue.
Sargent's assessment of the existing facilities, though
anticipated, was nevertheless astounding. Twelve elementary
schools had been built before the turn of the century and
were judged incapable of providing the minimum educational
facilities required of a modern school. An additional six-
teen elementary schools had been built between 1900 and 1920.
This meant that twenty-ei^t of thirty-five Nev7 Haven ele-
Sargent, New Schools for New Haven , p. 8.
^
^I~bid
. ,
pp . 16-17.
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mentary schools, a full eighty percent, were more than forty
years old. Two new high schools had been opened in 1958 al-
leviating some of the burden on the city’s four junior high
schools which ranged from twenty to almost forty years of
age.^^
In his recommendations Sargent developed a list of guid-
ing factors. New Haven, he felt, could best be served by
—
1 . equalizing educational opportunity for all children;
2. relating school buildings to geography and community,
3. providing economical and efficient school buildings
for sound educational programs,
4. avoiding one year schools for any pupils,
5. providing school buildings of a type and in loca-
tions which will be conducive to community use and
neighborhood strength,
6. providing a sound framework of flexibility for fu-
ture growth and change.
The Sargent report recommended a S20 million construction
program which called for the adoption of the grade structure
and fifteen new schools (forty percent of the entire school
plant). The new schools would be a third high school, ten
nev7 elementary schools, and four new intermediate schools.
Fourteen existing schools would be abandoned. Significantly,
the new building plan was based on the concept of elementary
and intenmediate schools serving neighborhood areas. Sargent
;^rote, "New Haven traditionally has endeavored to organize
its school system on that (neighborhood) basis. In fact, at
one time in New Haven’s history well before the turn of the
century, there were 65 schools in the New Haven school system
^
^Ibid
. ,
pp . 12-13.
^
^Ibid
. ,
p. 21
.
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as compared with 40 schools at present. This concept will be
preserved."
The second study, the Arthur D. Little study of the ad-
ministrative organization in the school system, was completed
late in the summer of 1961. It did for the existing bur-
eaucracy what the Sargent report had done just months earlier
for the existing plant facilities; namely, the Little report
recommended a substantial revision of the system’s adminis-
tration. The chain of authority was particularly vague and
overly personalized. This resulted, the report claimed, in
more informal leadership among the top professionals in the
system. Discretionary authority was seldom delegated, leav-
ing the system's top administrators responsible for many
mundane, daily tasks. Of several deficiencies found by the
study group, the most notable was the lack of a formal city-
wide in-se 2?vice training program for teachers and principals.
Barely six years later, another study vras commissioned
by the Board of Education to reexamine the organization and
administrative functioning of the system. Its findings, to
the dismay of many in the system, were in some cases remark-
ably similar to those in the Little study and even to those
in the Butterworth study of twenty years past! One example
is the matter of morale. Through a description of a symptom,
the Little report implied the existence of low morale among
the staff:
^^Ibid., p. 28.
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Tlier© is a lack of consis'boii't nnj.'tiial 'undors'taiidiiig
among the admmistrators as to the definition of
their responsibilities in relation to those of
others. In some areas this has resulted in sepa-
rated centers of authority and influence which are
not effectively integrated or coordinated,
The 1967 study was more empirical but not more explicit in
its finding:
On the basis of 76 two hour interviews, there ap-
peared from the analysis of the interview responses
evidence that morale, measured in terms of lack of
confidence m one’s fellows, is not all that it
should be.'
'
Another finding of the 1961 Little report was that there
was no centralized, coordinated curriculum planning to deal
with rapidly changing educational research and newly develop-
ing socio-economic conditions. By the time the Little report
had been submitted, the Board of Education had already em-
powered a task force to do a third and complementary report
focusing on curriculum needs of the system.
The task force worked throughout a ten week period of
the summer of 1961. In September the group submitted recom-
mendations designed to improve the effectiveness of education
in the public schools. Noting that ’’the keynote for wise
educators is flexibility," the recommendations stressed the
importance for the system to respond to the changing needs of
its clients due to many socio-economic factors and trends
which influence the relevance and applicability of education.
^
^Little, Administrative Organization , p. 1.
^^Price, Organization and Administrative Functioning,
p. 138.
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In addition to several efficiency measures (e.g, micro-
filming inactive records) and general urgings (e.g. encourage
wider use of community resources in school programs)
,
the
task force recommended "the gradual development of the conw
munity school program under school supervision and adminis-
1
8
tration," This recommendation, number sixteen of some
forty in total, was to have a most profound, programmatic im-
pact on the school system over the next decade.
" So the record shows that, having heralded the renaissance
of many American cities by demonstrating what could be done
through physical redevelopment. New Haven in 1962 was still
in great need of human renewal. Living conditions, particu-
larly among the increasing black population, were aggravated
by persistant, negative socio-economic factors: high unem-
ployment, immigration of poor. Concerned city officials had
become openly conscious of the deplorable conditions in New
Haven’s inner-city neighborhoods as early as the late 1950's.
New Haven's initial public response, guided by the most pro-
gressive members of the Board of Education with the general
support of the mayor's office, was to make a comprehensive
evaluation of public education in the city. The results of
the three separate studies provided a substantive base of
data, recommendations and professional opinions, as well as
a starting point from which redevelopment officials and other
social service agency people could devise a city-wide reform
program of community action.
^^Education Task Force, Blueprint for Better Education ,
p. 112.
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CHAPTER II
THE COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM AGENCY
AND THE NEW HAVEN SCHOOL SYSTEM
In late 1959 executives of New Haven’s Redevelopment
Agency sought a way and the necessary means to respond to
the increasing reality of multi—problem families "uncovered"
by urban renewal. A brief document, "A Program for Commun-
ity improvement in New Haven"
,
was quickly developed and an
initial approach to the Ford Foundation attempted. The re-
quest was denied and the effort was temporarily abandoned.
Moynihan uses the remarks made in 1963 by one of Ford
Foundation’s principal executives, Dr. Paul Ylvisaker, to il-
lustrate the foundation’s philosophy at this time. Speaking
on "Community Action: A Response to Some Unfinished Busi-
ness," Ylvisaker indicated that Ford was looking for planning
based on four precepts: 1) that the city is a system; 2)
that "awakening self-respect" is the most powerful agent for
human renewal; 3) that certain parts of the urban social sys-
tem can be perfected by rational means and specific devices;
4) that new, effective social inventions could arise from
-j
agencies which already exist in the community. The Rede-
velopment Agency’s proposal lacked both this systematic ap-
proach and the necessary depth to earn the foundation’s sup-
port ,
The following year a more concerted effort began,
** Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding:
Community Action in the War on Poverty (New York: The Free
Press, 1970), pp. 40-41.
~
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Howard Hallman, the young director of the Redevelopment
Agency’s Division of Neighborhood Improvement, revived the
initial proposal and organized a small but diverse group of
New Haven professionals to plan a comprehensive human re-
newal program for the city.^ The city’s chief executive.
Mayor Richard C. Lee, and the Superintendent of Schools,
Justin 0’ Brian, did not actively participate in the planning
group; however, the effort had the general support of the
mayor and the group knowingly anticipated the imminent re-
placement of the superintendent and therefore, did not in-
clude him. The mayor’s confidence, influence, and national
bravura were instrumental in moving the planning to the point
of June, 1961, when Hallman’s group, with Redevelopment
Agency director Ed Loque, and the mayor, reestablished contact
with the Ford Foundation.
Negotiations and planning sessions continued through the
fall and on into the winter. By early spring, agreements
were reached on the way and the means by which New Haven
would assault its chronic social problems. The way as de-
scribed in the foimding document "Opening Opportunities" was
a private, non-profit organization named Community Progress,
Incorporated (CPI) working in conjunction V7ith the New Haven
Public School System and employment agencies to bring to bear
^See Russell Murphy, Political Entrepreneurs and Urban
Poverty (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company,
1971), pp. 38-39.
^ ^ ^ +
The planning group consisted of six members of private
social service agsncies, three educators from the local sys-
tem, and five staff members of the Redevelopment Agency.
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the necessary attention and resources to confront neighbor-
hood problems, Ylvisaker of Ford later remarked
i
We have placed the Ford Foundation's first bet
not on the central business district of the city
but on its school system, and more on school out-
look and methods than on buildings; on the city
and metropolitan area's employment system, on their
administration of justice, and a grovjing list of
similarly critical "production processes" vrhich are
currently bottlenecks in the process of citizen-
building. 5
The bet in New Haven's case was a three year, 2.5 million
dollar "gray areas" grant establishing the nation's first
community action agency.'^
•5
^Moynihan, p, 41
.
4A minor controversy continues among several claimants
to this distinction. Private social service agencies have
existed for decades. The comprehensive, private non-profit
agency of the Community Action Program (CAP) agency proto-
type is a more recent social invention. A forerunner of
the single, coordinating agency emphasizing community organi-
zation was Mobilization for Youth, Inc. of New York City. It
was originally conceived in 1957, incorporated shortly later,
proposed for funding by prospectus in 1961, and finally
funded and implemented in May, 1962. In the meantime, four
cities were being fimded in quick succession through the
Ford Foundation "gray areas" Public Affairs Program. Of
these New Haven received the second grant in April, 1962,
but was the first to incorporate its city-wide program under
one agency. Oakland, California, the first recipient {$2
million) in December, 1961, chose to allocate its money and
coordinate programs among existing social service agencies.
Boston's agency, Action for Boston Community Development,
Inc. (ABCD), though formed as a private, non-profit agency
in early 1961, was not funded until mid-summer 1962. Phila-
delphia, the last of the four initial grantees, followed New
Haven's experience in redevelopment and packaged a compre-
hensive program under a private, non-profit corporation
which Ford funded in December, 1962.
New Haven received the first grant from the Federal
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in November, 1964.
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Coalition reform is not a new strategy. Literally for
centnries, governments, political parties, and social move-
ments have been predicated upon the concept which unifies
factions for the purpose of achieving common objectives. The
aspect of coalition reform in education in New Haven which
niakes it truly unique is the unprecedented marriage of in-
formal decision-making, resource sharing, and commitment to
social processes which resulted in institutional change in
New Haven's public school system. From 1962 until 1972, New
Haven's community action program and school system identified
common objectives, developed and coordinated programs, af-
fected and influenced legislation, shared mutual achievements
and suffered ignominious crises. The ten years under study
here can be more easily understood through an examination of
the four principle phases in the coalition's existence: the
formative, peak, transitional, and terminal phases.
The Formative Phase 1961-1962
New Haven's commitment to human renewal had formed at
least in conscience by late 1959 and early I960, Specific
action commenced and gained momentum through the education
studies by Cyril Sargent (March, 1961), Arthur D, Little
(August, 1961), and the Education Task Force (September,
1961), Working prior to and concurrently during these as-
sessments, the group formed by Hallman prepared a new draft
of a comprehensive, community organization program and was
pursuing negotiations with the Ford Foundation for funding.
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The coalition plan was established early in the informal
deliberations of the planners. A consensus existed on the
critical role of the educational system in the effort but
some disagreement arose about the nature of the cooperating
outside" agency. Hallman suggested the creation of a pri-
vate non-profit organization. Frank Harris of the Greater
New Haven Community Council proposed using the New Haven Citi-
zen’s Action Commission (CAC) as the responsible agency. The
commission, a blue ribbon panel of community leaders, had
served Mayor Lee's redevelopment program very well over the
years as a legitimating base of community support.^ Hallman
won over Harris’ suggestion with the argument that any exist-
ing organization including the CAC was likely to have too
many inhibitors — entrenched relationships. Civil Service
regulations, and political debts — to adequately undertake
the human renewal task.^ Another fear was that a city agency
coul.d not manage the objectives of social reform and institu-
tional change through new relationships and with outside
money simply because of the political nature and stigma as-
sociated V7ith it. A private, non-profit agency could. Hall-
^Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an
American City (Nevx Haven : Yale University Press, 19^1),
pp. 156- 137 .
^An interesting and possibly predictable parallel to
this scenario v^as repeated in 1 964 when high level members
of the Johnson administration were planning the National War
on Poverty. They, too, concurred with the need for an inde-
pendent, new agency and thereby gave birth to the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO). Lyndon Baines Johnson, T^
Vantage Point; Persnectives of the Presidency 1963-4^9
(l^ew lorY: Popular Library, 1971), pp. 75-Y6.
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man later vTrote,
3-S6ncy eventually created) and other
members of the New Haven coalition.
. .realized thatpoverty and related social problems stem from a com-plexity of interrelated causes. Persons are trappedin these conditions because something is not workingproperly in the social system. To get at these
causes, to open opportunities for people to help them-
selves, it is necessary to make corrections in the
social system, that is, to bring about institutional
change
.
With this as a starting point, it is then possible
to look upon the city as a network of interrelated
systems. There is an educational system, an employ-
ment system, a system of health and welfare services,
^d so on. Each system is organized differently, but
it usually includes both public and private agencies
and it involves not only local governmental agencies,
but also state and national agencies. \/hen a system
is functioning effectively, it will respond to new
problems as they emerge and make necessary adaptations.
But the existence of mass poverty in an affluent so-
ciety suggests a serious lack in one or more fimctional
systems .. ,CPI acts as a catalyst to assist each func-
tional system in embarking upon changes that v^ill mean
more effective services to the poverty group. It
serves as a coordinator so that the functional systems
will work together as an integrated network.
7
New Haven’s blueprint gradually emerged as two major
coalition efforts and numerous minor alliances which served
as service linkages. Education and employment agencies were
forged into distinct coalitions within a larger referral net-
work of complementary organizations. The concern here is
with the former.
With a tacit agreement in effect between the city and the
Ford Foundation by late winter 1961-62, attention turned most
logically to the critical success factor of leadership. The
question was not only who would head the nev7 agency but who
"^Robert E. Will and Harold G. Vatter, eds.. Poverty in
Affluence; The Social. Political and Economic Dimensions
of Poverty in the United otates (New York; Harcourt, Brace
,
and World, Inc., 196!?), pp. ^49, 251 .
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would lead the agency’s institutional counterpart, the school
system. At this time, the school system was in the process
of changing superintendents. The liberal persuasion on the
Board of Education, primarily Lee appointees, had been led
1961 by a state labor leader, Mitchell Sviridoff,
who served his last two terms as president of that body. The
Board was seeking a superintendent v^hose philosophy and ideas
were consistent with the reformist mood in the city and whose
vision and ambition v;ere commensurate with the task. Educa-
"tion and the educational system were being touted as primary
instruments for human renewal. The system — with its out-
moded facilities and archaic curricula — was also mired in
a bureaucracy incapable of responding to the dramatic re-
quirements of institutional reform. The three studies,
treated in Chapter I, gave Board members some measure of the
new task and the capabilities required of a new leader in ac-
complishing it. They chose Dr. Lawrence Paquin, a profes-
sional educator from G-lastonbury, Connecticut. As Glaston-
bury's superintendent, Paquin achieved a notable reputation
as a top administrator vrho insisted upon a periodic teaching
assignment for himself. He authored two social science text
books and coordinated the development of a foreign language
program which received national recognition through a SI mil-
lion federal grant, a sum uncommon to a 3f800 student school
system.
Paquin, as superintendent- elect, and Sviridoff, the
knowledgeable labor leader and Board of Education member.
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participated in the planning and final negotiations with the
Ford Fonndation. On April 12, 1962, Mayor Lee annoimced the
grant award by the Ford Foundation and the incorporation of
Community Progress, Incorporated (CPI) to handle the funds.
Four days later, the CPI Board of Directors at Lee's direc-
tion named Mitchell Sviridoff the executive director of the
new agency charged with spearheading the, city’s war on pov-
• Sviridoff 's long affiliation with the mayor and his
record of championing liberal causes might have been enough
to qualify him for the job. But his seven year tenure on the
Board of Education and his intimate knowledge and experience
in labor and employment problems and practices amply quali-
fied him.
little time was wasted in forming the organization of
CPI. No doubt as a reward for his interest and efforts,
Howard Hallman became Sviridoff 's deputy, the number two man
at CPI. Additional staff members were recruited immediately
and preparations were begun to implement their reform strategy.
The man who was to play a most crucial operational role
for the school system was hired by the superintendent after
CPI's initial staff had been chosen. That man, Ralph G-oglia,
had been seeking a position with CPI in the spring of 1962.
®Mayor Lee's influence was perhaps more ostentatious
by his selection of Sviridoff as executive director and his
appointees to the agency's Board of Directors. The direct
telephone line between Sviridoff 's office and Lee's suggests
a continuing political intimacy with the agency's decision-
making leadership.
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As the executive director of a health and welfare agency in
Hartford, Connecticut, Goglia was qualified for many adminis-
trative positions with CPI. Instead, Goglia received a call
from the acting superintendent, Paquin, and was offered the
directorship of the Community School Program, the initial op-
erational arm of the reform coalition's strategy.
The Community School Program, as projected in the "Open-
Opportunities" document and as officially endorsed by the
Board of Education in August, 1962, extends the role of the
school far beyond traditional limits, A true community school
v;as defined in the following way:
1 . as an educational center — as the place where
children and adults have opportunities for
studying and learning; -
2. as a neighborhood center — as the place where
citizens of all ages may take part in such things
as sports, physical fitness programs, informal
recreation, arts and crafts classes, civic meet-
ings, and other similar leisure time activities;
3. as a center for community services — as the place
where individuals and families may obtain health
services, counseling services, legal aid, employ-
ment services, and the like;
4. as an important center of neighborhood or community
life — the idea being that the school will serve
as the institutional agency that will assist citi-
zens in the study and solution of significant neigh-
borhood problems.
9
The CPI-Board of Education coalition was to use the Comr-
munity School concept — made possible through the Ford
Foundation grant — to implement a delivery system of criti-
^Ralph Goglia, "The Commimity School" (paper presented
at the 65th Annual Conference of the Massachusetts Confer-
ence on Social Welfare, Boston, Massachusetts, December 4,
1968), pp. 5-6.
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cal neighborhood services, leisure time activities, and a
long-term educational program aimed at the prevention of
poverty
.
Officials at CPI and the Board of Education used the re-
maining months of 1 962 to gear up their respective institu-
tions for full operation by January 1
,
1963« The formative
phase drew to a close in a flurry of activity v^hich fo\md CPI
completing its hiring of initial staff, establishing its head-
quarters in a central business district building shared by a
furniture store (and barely half a block from the Board of
Education and City Hall)
,
and facing the future optimistically
with all the security and enthusiasm that more than two and a
half million dollars can provide. At the same time, the Board
of Education and the school system administered by Superinten-
dent Paquin prepared to implement the Community School Program
as v:ell as a host of recommendations, garnered from the Sargent,
Education Task Force, and Little studies. Human renewal was
on the threshold of reality in New Haven.
The Peak Phase 1963-1969
Coalition reform was perhaps never more effective or
healthy than in the 1963-1965 period. This can be attributed
in part to the enthusiasm generated by the participating so-
cial planners, some educators, neighborhood residents, and
volunteers. CPI staff in administration and programs ex-
panded with each grant renewal. Starting with fewer than a
dozen full-time employees, by 1965 CPI employed 169 New Haven
33
residents fiill-tiine and over 2,200 others in various part-
ly
time and volunteer program capacities
.
(Table 2:1).
TABLE 2:1
COiyiMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM STAFF
TOTAL AND INDIGENOUS BY EMPLOYEE CATEGORY
Total
. Staff Indigenous
Category Number io of total Number % of total
Senior Staff 38 1.5 1 3
Professionals and
Middle Management 83 3.3 16 19
'
Teachers 89 3.6 6 7
Professional Aides 409 16.3 333 81
Clerical 102 4.1 40 39
Part-time 580 23.2 330 57
Volunteers 1202 48.0 417 35
TOTAL 2503 100.0 1143 46
Source: CPI, Community Action Program Review (Ne'w Haven:
CPI, 1965), p. 92.
Much must be attributed, however, to the availability of
funds and to the neimess of CPI and the processes fashioned
by it. Participation in CPI-Board of Education programs was,
in fact, an attractive employment opportunity for profes-
sionals and a convenient employment or volunteer opportunity
for indigenous residents.
Funds vfere never a problem during this three year period.
A precondition of the Ford agreement required matching por-
tions of money. Federal sources responded graciously after
34
the initial grant by the President’s Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency was used to acquire the first Ford grant. Seem-
ingly on a monthly basis, CPI tapped new Federal sources for
program funds from such government branches as the Department
of Labor, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and
eventually, the Office of Economic Opportunity. In the case
of the last, CPI received the first community action program
grant in November, 1964. The influx of funds, some S9.4 mil-
the end of 1965, also included increasing contribu-
tions by local private sources and the city of New Haven (See
Table 2:2).
In addition to grantmanship
,
a principal function of CPI
was to act as a conduit for funds to the Board of Education
and other agencies conducting cooperative programs. Some
twenty-five public and private agencies spent 58.1 percent of
the funds received by CPI. Allocations by these agencies
and CPI clearly reaffirmed the establishment of education and
employment as city-wide priorities. Breaking dom the total
among the ten program areas over the three year period pro-
vides a good indication of the variety of activities V7hich
came under the aegis of community action (Table 2:5).
During these years, a wide range of education programs,
to be discussed in detail in Chapter III, were devised and
implemented, revised and expanded or deleted. In themselves
the programs represented a departure from the normal or usual
^
^Community Progress, Inc., Comunlty Action Program
Revievj (New Haven: CPI, 1965), p. 95
.
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TABLE 2:3
ALLOCATIONS OP FUNDS BY PROGRAM AREA
1962-1965
Percent
Manpower and Employment
Education
Neighborhood Services
Health and Welfare
Research and Program Evaluation
Legal and Correctional
Human Relations
Administration
Leisure Time
Staff Training and Development
36.7
23.5
8.2
12.2
3.8
2.4
1 .3
3.9
4.4
3.6
Source; CPI, Community Action Program Review
, May, 1965.
school tradition and responsibility and as such, they were
bound to encounter resistance. Farrell notes in his book
A Climate of Change ;
...there is the kind of resistance that springs from
the established, comfortable ennui of one sort of bur-
eaucracy or another. There is the kind of resistance
which has its roots in race prejudice, or in the vague
fear that the CPI program is somehow a plot to turn
over the city to the Negro, that it is somehov: anti-
white. And there is the natural kind of resistance to
change aroused in the conservative citizen who wonders
just how much of all this new activity can really be
good for New Haven, and worries that perhaps it is all
moving just a bit too fast.'
‘
Change is seldom accomplished in a mood of ^emutlichkeit .
Early opposition to CPI and its allied efforts took the form
of cautious speculation by the city’s evening newspaper, the
New Haven Register. It editorialized that every citizen
^ Gregory Farrell, A Climate of Change (Brimswick, New
Jersey; Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 57.
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should be concerned about the fiscal implications of CPI’s
existence after the Ford money was spent Prom other
quarters, opposition was a bit more acute. "Some New Haven
teachers and social workers resented the invasion of a new
force of non-professionals into what had previously been the
professional’s exclusive battleground. Some of them objected,
publicly and privately, to the new demands made upon their
time and consciences." ^ In July, 1963, a group called the
League of Independent Voters created an education study group
of resident school teachers, administrators, PTA, and union
members. Ostensibly, their primary concern was to investigate
the Board of Education’s duties and responsibilities and as-
certain the full degree of involvement with CPI. In other
words, their resistance to the reform movement vras being mani-
fested by their public speculation that the Board of Education
was losing control of the school system to outsiders
.
^
The single most threatening public reaction which di-
rectly and indirectly confronted the two coalition parties
stemmed from a controversy on an issue which continues to be-
leaguer school systems — busing to achieve racial balance.
On September 23, 1963, the Board of Education resolved to im-
plement a plan to overcome racial segregation in the New
Haven schools. ^ facto segregation was an undeniable fact
1 ?
New Haven Register , January 23, 1963.
^
^Farrell, p. 57.
^
^Nevr Haven Register , July 8, 1963.
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of city life in New Haven at the time. Black students com-
prised 39.5 percent of the total elementary school population.
Of thirty-one elementary schools, blacks represented more than
50 percent of the student population in ten schools, more than
90 percent of the population in three of those ten (See Table
2:4). The system's four junior high schools were 36.7 percent
black j however, one of those schools was 90.2 percent black
and another 52.5 percent (Table 2:5). As early as July, 1963,
the NAACP had brought the segregation matter to the attention
of the Board of Education. Its president, John Braslin, as-
sured NAACP representatives that the Board would devise a
plan to address the imbalance problem and hence the September
commitment in the form of a resolution. A one year deadline —
September, 1964 — was established for implementation.
P' The superintendent and two special assistants devised a
plan which would send more white students and fewer black
students to the two predominantly black junior high schools.
In addition, a grade reorganization of several elementary
schools promised to alleviate overcrowding and create avail-
able seats for black children to attend predominantly white
elementary schools ^ choice .
The integration plan was inexplicably leaked to the
public before the Board of Education officially released or
even considered it! On June 3> 1964» the Board and the plan
came under serious attack by citizens in those areas in which
the plan called for the busing of white students to predomin-
antly black schools. Superintendent Paquin bore the brunt of
40
TABLE 2:4
RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OP PUPILS
IN NEW HAVEN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
NOVEMBER 1963
io of Whites io of Blacks io of others
Baldwin 4.8 94.2 1 .0
Barnard 91 .0 6.5 2.5Beecher 98.5 1 .5
Brennan 41 .5 56.4 2.1
Cheever 83.4 11.4 5.2
Clinton Ave. 85.3 12.8 1 .9
Conte 43.3 42.3 4.4
Davis 98.9 .7 .4
Horace Day 50.1 46.2 3.7
Dwight 16.7 79.4 3.9
Edgewood 98.5 .6
.9
Edwards St. 82.0 15.4 2 .
6
Hale 99.6
.4
Hooker 97.0 1 .5 1 .5
Ivy St. 11.0 88.0 1 .0
Jepson 100.00 —
Kimberly Ave. 78.1 18. A 3.5
Lincoln 8.6 90.4 1.0
Lloyd St. 70.8 23.6 5.6
Lovell 86.0 11 .2 2.8
Prince St. 28.6 57.5 13.9
Ross 91 .3 8.0 .7
Scranton 32.8 62 .
6
4.6
Sherman 49.5 48.8 1 .7
Strong 88.9 10.7 .4
Truman 74.2 21 .6 4.2
Welch 35.0 50.9 14.1
West Hills 45.9 52.7 1 .4
V/inchester 4.0 93.0 3.0
Woodward 99.0 .6 .4
Woolsey 69.9 24.9 5.2
Averaged
Totals 56.9 35.9 3.6
Source: Nev: Haven Public Schools
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TABLE 2:5
RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUPILS
IN NEW HAVEN JUITIOR AND SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS
NOVEMBER 1963
Junior High Schools io of \^ites io of Blacks ^ of Others
Bassett
Pair Haven
Sheridan
Troup
9.0 90.2
.8
57.4 10.2 2.4
83.4 16.3
.3
44.9 52.5 2.6
Averaged
Totals 61.7 36.7 1.6
Senior High Schools
Wilhur Cross 78.2
James Hillhouse 79.5
21.2 .6
19.9 .6
Averaged
Totals 78.9 20.5 .6
Source
:
New Haven Public Schools
CO
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the assault. Many who had resented the educational system's
relationship with CPI held Paquin directly responsible for
the radical changes, of which busing was just one, occurring
in the system. Several meetings produced the worst public
demonstrations of white fear and covert racial hatred that New
Haven had ever witnessed. The Board of Education and Paquin
were subsequently forced to reconsider their plan. Rejecting
the suggestion of one way busing, that of blacks to predom-
inantly white schools, an eleventh hour proposal by one Board
member proposed the pairing of white and black schools in cer-
tain grades. "This idea did not pick just one school in any
area but took all of them en mass and therefore answered the
complaints of 'why just my child?' It also included the
elimination of 7th and 8th grades from all but two elementary
schools, thereby opening more elementary school space to al-
leviate overcrowding and to allow open enrollment; i.e, par-
ents had the option to send their children to any one of sev-
1
5
eral elementary schools within a district."
Paquin and the Board survived the crisis when reaction
to the plan appeared cautiously favorable. On July 8th the
Board adopted the plan for the September, 1964, school year,
^^Allan Talbot, The Mayor's Game: Richard C. Lee of
New Haven and the Politics of Change (New York: Harper
and Rov7, 1 967 ) , p. 264.
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thus meeting its original commitment J ^ Though a disgruntled
small group of residents attempted to get an injunction pre-
venting its implementation, the plan was affirmed when the
Connecticut Superior Court denied the injunction. One month
later Paquin announced he would resign in one year to become
the Superintendent of the Baltimore Public School System.
If the years of this phase were controversial for the
school system, they were relentlessly challenging to CPI.
CPI began the 1 962-65 era seeking internal stability and ex-
ternal acceptance. The allocation of funds during this per-
iod indicates that educational reform, though instrumental in
its overall strategy, was not the only priority or the major
beneficiary of CPI funding (Table 2:2, p. 35). The manpower
and employment area received equal priority in the agency
from its inception.
\'Jhen CPI organized in the Spring of 1962, a Manpovrer
Division was established, and a grant was given to
the Central Labor Council, enabling it to assign a
full-time representative to work on the Manpower Pro-
gram. Soon after full-time representatives were also
assigned by the State Department of Education (Voca-
tional Education) and the Eew Haven Board of Education
(Adult Education) and a representative of the State
Employment Service shortly thereafter. This staff
functioned as a permanent working committee to design
and carry out various manpower programs often consult-
^
^Historically, the record actually shows that the New
Haven Board of Education did not act with all due dispatch.
Rollin Osterweis notes that ”on July 7, 1069, Negro residents
petitioned for the ending of discrimination and segregation
in the public schools; and the Board of Education moved to
incorporate *the colored children* into the regular school
system." Three Centuries of New Haven 1638-1938 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 195’3)f p. 343.
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ing with labor and management representatives J
The manpower effort suggests a basic duplication of the
coalition strategy. Sviridoff and his manpower director,
George Bennett, applied concurrently the same strategy of co-
operative planning, joint sponsorship of programs, and shared
resources to induce participation.^® The major difference be-
tween the education and manpower strategies was manifest in
results. Manpower, even educational manpower programs, pro-
duced impressive statistics indicative of immediate surface
success in its training and placement programs. Education
could boast of significant numbers of participants in its
various programs but could not easily, or wisely, translate
mere participation in its programs into educational achieve-
ment in such a brief span of time. Implicitly the intent in
education was aimed at the long term results which would have
an accumulated preemptive effect on poverty.
Riding an illusory wave of success and acceptance, CPI
encountered the same difficulty as its partner and, in fact,
from a group born during the integration crisis. The Better
Education Committee and its leader, Joseph Einhom, after
failing to get an injunction against the integration plan,
1
7
'Community Progress, Inc., Second Annual Program Re-
viev7 for the Eord Eoundation 1963-64 (New Haven: CPI, 1%4),
•
ct:
1 ft
The manpower coalition existed publicly as a creation
of CPI's administration and information service; however, in
fact, it existed as a tenuous working arrangement. See
Russell D. Murphy, Political Entrepreneurs and Urban Poverty
(Lexington, Massachusetiis : D.C. Heath and Company, 1971),
p. 112.
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continued to select issues and positions critical of the edu-
cational system, Mayor Lee, and CPI. CPI, the group main-
tained, V7as run hy opportunistic social schemers who had
"v/rested control of basic municipal functions through the use
of outside money and influence, Einhom used this type of
attack repeatedly to implicate the Mayor, his policies, and
appointees. It culminated for Einhom in the 1965 Republican
nomination for mayor and virtually terminated with his defeat
by a Lee landslide in November. The coalition had vreathered
its greatest threat.
Other events bolstered local enthusiasm and reaffirmed
the coalition’s existence. The passage of the Equal Oppor-
timities Act (vrritten with the aid of Sviridoff and Hallman)
in 1 964 established the Federal War on Poverty and a federal
agency, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to distribute
funds for local anti-poverty initiatives. On November 25,
1964, CPI was awarded the first grant by OEO for S450,000.
Four months later the Ford Foundation demonstrated another
measure of approval when it awarded CPI a second S2.5 million
three-year grant. That news had barely arrived when the Con-
gress passed the historic Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 offering new and critical financial support for
local education.
The Transitional Phase 1966-1969
The endpoint of the peak phase and, therefore, the
starting point of the transitional phase defies precise de-
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lineation. In fact, it is more the accumulation of events
and circumstances over a period of time rather than a specific
date or one event. V/hereas the peak phase represented the
apogee of intense cooperation and activity in the symbiotic
CPI-Board of Education relationship, the transitional phase
was occasioned by a disintegration of that original bond; new
circumstances, a nev; set of required responses on the part of
the Board of Education, dictated a change. Certainly the de-
parture of Superintendent Paquin in August, 1965, marks the
beginning of the peak phase decline. Many link this event
directly to the crisis in confidence over the busing-integra-
tion issue whose indirect impact had yet to reach CPI.
Other causal factors are not so easily observable or de-
fined. By 1966 CPI had a four year demonstration period dur-
ing which its actions and its investments, strategical and
financial, bore the appearance of success, as interpreted by
CPI, Ford, OEO, and the Department of Labor. These invest-
ments paid off handsomely in establishing a national reputa-
tion and in attracting the necessary funds to continue and
expand. CPI was a model community action program not only
because it had been first, but because by being first, it ex-
1
9
plotted its capability to be a showcase program.
^^CPI’s national reputation grew enormously through
CPI-initiated, government, or unsolicited media publicity.
For example, in one fifteen month period (January, 1964 -
March, 1965), CPI accommodated 1127 out-of-tov/n visitors who
sought to witness the model agency in action. Community
Progress, Inc., Community Action Program Review (New Haven:
CPI, 1965), p. 0^-
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That reputation also had not so peculiar local effects.
^y““Product of the formative and peak years of the agency
and its distinctive operating style was a growing member of
S^3-Ss roots’* spokesmen v^hich included many issue—
militants j parents j and youths who had either parti-
cipated in a CPI program or had otherwise been affected by
one. After some four years, these numbers were becoming sig-
nificant; persistent issues highlighted by CPI's efforts were
becoming a major factor in the espousal of community confron-
tation. Intensifying national influences, e.g. the Civil
Rights struggle and the emerging Black Power movement, the
Watts riots, also contributed to a heightened sense of com-
munity power. Debate over its exercise polarized: on one
extreme stood the black militants; and on the other those who
sought answers and responses through the formal channels of
government and community participation.
The modus operandi for self-determination was not a clear
one for New Haven's blacks. Por many blacks, the integration
crisis and particularly the white—dominated emotional meetings
which ensued served as the final indictment against white-
controlled and dominated public decision-making in New Haven
and against the complacency most blacks had hitherto demon-
strated toward the decision-making processes affecting their
lives. One description of this decisive period epitomizes
this turning point:
Despite anger and provocation, the Negroes showed
amazing self-control and moderation. V/hile white
families held private protest meetings guarded care-
fully by self-appointed vigilantes to keep "outsiders
48
thill
Negroes restricted their discussions tos ops and living rooms, where there were angry dis-cussions and, now and then, calls for militant
however, the Negroes re-
thSselves!?^
community fought among
At this point few could foresee the militany occasioned by
riots in Detroit, Newark, and the long hot New Haven summer
of 1967, almost exactly three years after the busing crisis.
The CPI-Board of Education coalition in transition re-
flected a social metamorphosis, a maturation of institutional,
community, and individual roles. The major transitional ele-
ments were:
a. an exodus of the original principals, the
architects of the coalition;
b, increased internal and external criticism
aimed at CPI;
c, major racial disturbances in the New Haven
schools, and
d. a shifting reliance on the part of CPI and
the Board of Education to new sources for
program funds.
It seems inevitable that good teams, in social reform as
well as in sports, never last too long. In the months follow-
ing Paquin's resignation, Sviridoff spent much of his time
heading a task force studying New York City's comprehensive
20Talbot, The Mayor ' s G-ame , p. 202.
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O iImman resource needs. That venture ultimately led to his
resignation in October, 1966, to head New York City's new
superagency, the Human Resources Administration (HRA) under
John Lindsay.
Other principal administrators, including Deputy Direc-
tor Howard Hallman and Manpower Director George Bennett, also
left for other jobs, usually with higher pay and more pres-
tige, on the national level or in cities much larger than New
Haven. Their experience in New Haven uniquely qualified them
in the fields of urban strategy and poverty entrepreneurship.
Attractive employment opportunities were particularly abundant
in these areas: public and private agencies on the national
level were in need of experienced personnel to develop and
manage their master strategies in the war on poverty, and the
more urban areas were extremely eager to employ those with
successfully demonstrated expertise. On a weekly basis each
New Haven loss was another city’s gain.
Internal criticism also contributed to the changing na-
ture of the coalition. Dissatisfied neighborhood employees
were becoming more bitter and more public in their criticism
of CPI's administration. Federal dicta on citizen or resi-
dent participation in anti-poverty efforts, though mandated
^^The study, sponsored by the Institute of Public Ad-
ministration and paid for by the Ford Foundation, was the
basis for consolidating New York City's social services in
health, education, and welfare under the Human Resources
Administration. Developing Nevr York City ' s Human Resources
(New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1965).
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as a requirement for funding (in the Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964), resulted in accusations of tokenism and rubber
stamp participation (see Chapter IV). In many cities across
the nation time had run out by 1967; the brutal reality of
ghetto conditions was dramatized by summer riots,
^ New Haven, the Model City, could not escape this same
trauma in spite of its relative progress,. Despite fourteen
manpower programs funded with $2,150,828 in federal money and
sixteen educational and community service programs worth an
additional $2,251,042 in federal funds (not including Ford
outlays), the city endured six frantic days of disorder in
its worst ghetto area, the Hill. The National Advisory Cont-
mission on Civil Disorders concluded that the same factors
which precipitated rioting in Detroit's 12th Street area were
the immediate causes for New Haven's disturbance: 1) crowded
ghetto living conditions, worsened by summer heat; 2) youth
on the streets; 3) hostility to police; 4) delay in appro-
priate police response; and 5) persistent rumor and inade-
quate information. Principals at CPI, the Board of Educa-
tion, and City Hall pondered the root causes for some sense
of redirection and perhaps a reason to assuage their indivi-
dual guilt
.
^^Figures are as reported in CPI to the National Ad-
visory Committee on Civil Disorders, Report of the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam
Books, ''1968}, pp. 188, 195.
^^National Advisory Commission, Report on Civil Dis-
orders
, p. 325.
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At CPI introspection manifested itself in a philosophi-
cal and program review led by Mitchell Sviridoff's successor,
Lawrence Spitz. This ultimately concluded that ~
not because of the outbursts, but because oflong festering conditions which the outbursts
merely pointed up, CPI had to do more to gal-
vanize and strengthen the Inner City. And ithad to do this with or without increased helpfrom a Federal Government whose attitudes to-
ward the V/ar on Poverty had chronically vacil-
lated. ^4
Guilt is not easy to assume; however, reasoning softened the
blow to CPI:
CPI has never laid claim to a perfect or near-
perfect formula for rooting out the privation
and frustration and anguish whose continuance
can mean recurrent violence and threats of vio-
lence in this and every other city. Prom the
outset, CPI's programs have had to be experi-
mental and fraught with great risk. No one had
ever dram a blueprint for a massive attack on
deprivation, yet action had to be bold and
sweeping. Social decay and human suffering had
gone too far to permit timid and small-scale
attempts at solutions.
. .large-scale experiments
and great risks inevitably invite big mistakes.
Redirection was essential. The winter months of 1967-68
provided time in which CPI began to rethink its philosophy
and its programmatic strategies. Spitz and his staff pri-
vately explored the possibilities of decentralization. De-
centralization, they felt, was undeniably a concept whose
time had come. It meant a rejection of CPI's basic "do for"
and its strangely unique "do with" philosophies in favor of
a "do it themselves" strategy for the neighborhoods, with
^^Community Progress, Inc., The Human Story , 1967 (New
Haven; CPI, 1967), i.
^^Ibid.
,
i-ii.
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only technical assistance from CPI. Neighborhood corpora-
tions would exercise self-determination through program de-
velopment, management, and fiscal responsibility.
Barely had the decision for decentralization been made
public, V7hen Spitz announced his resignation to return to a
lucrative position in organized labor. The nevr executive
director, Milton Brown, who had been CPI's Director of Coiit-
Services and one of the original CPI administrators in
1962
,
immediately made a firm and irrevocable commitment to
the decentralization concept.
The busing crisis, the summer riots, and city hall poli-
tics all resulted in sharp criticism of the mayor, CPI, and
Of\
the Board of Education. For CPI, external criticism became
acute in early 1 968 when Third District Congressman Robert
Giaimo castigated CPI's staff from the floor of the House of
Representatives. He accused certain highly paid staff mem-
bers of social opportunism and flagrant mismanagement of pub-
lic funds by paying high salaries, exorbitant fringe benefits,
and inordinately high administrative costs. Progress and re-
sults, he concluded, were pitifully meager, and for the most
part a creation of CPI's public relations division. His most
serious indictment was that CPI's attitude towards existing
agencies vfas contemptible:
Its (CPI's) attitude that these agencies had done
nothing to solve local problems is incorrect. Its
^^In July, 1969 , Mayor Lee announced that he would not
seek reelection giving rise to speculation that the riots
and discontent in the city had broken his spirit after six-
teen years in office. See Powledge, Model City, pp. 12-14.
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attitude that if it could not control the local agencyit would have little or nothing to do vrith it is
wrong... I am convinced that... many fine local agenciesin New Haven. .. could do a much better job than CPI and
with much smaller overhead costs... if the 18 milliondollars CPI has received had been given to these local
agencies without the CPI hierarchy and superstructure
draining off most of the money, we would have had more
effective accomplishments in the antipoverty war. They
hardly could have done worse . 27
CPI publicly refuted Giaimo’s charges but the cause of
its critics had been served simply by the fact that allega-
tions had been made. This attack also contributed to the de-
cision by CPI to divest itself of its extensive power to de-
termine what was best for New Haven’s poor.
V/hat CPI and the Board of Education had endured separ-
ately in the common struggle was amplified during this phase
by the occurrence of racial disturbances in the New Haven
schools. Racial violence and vandalism broke out at Hill-
house High School on December 15f 1967, when, according to
reports, a white boy punched a black girl who refused to stand
before the American flag. A bi-racial meeting of approxi-
mately 700 Hillhouse parents met on December 1 9 to invest!-
28
gate ways of dealing with the heightening racial tension.
A few months later more incidents occurred at Hillhouse and
at Lee High School, the new school named after the mayor.
This was followed by outbreaks at Sheridan Middle School. A
^^U.S., Congress, House, Congressman Giaimo speaking on
his investigation into the operations of Connmmity Progress,
Inc., 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., January 18, 1968, Congressional
Record
,
H108-H112.
^®Ad Hoc Parent’s Committee, Hillhouse Progress Report ,
April, 1968.
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fundamental belligerency by both black and white students la
an atmosphere of antagonism added to the intellectual mili-
tancy of a few to produce altercations and tension. The
local Commission on Equal Opportunities investigated the
causes and found "long smoldering discontent" between school
administrators, teachers, and students. The Commission recom-
mended more community participation in the schools.
The events did in fact spur increased community partici-
through a decentralized educational decision-making
process (see Chapter IV, p.102). They also indicated that
programs and money did not constitute panaceas, that the dis-
content which spilled over into the streets had also inun-
dated the schools. New leadership and nev: responses were re-
quired of the school system and this meant a further change in
the CPI-Board of Education coalition.
A final transitional influence on the coalition was the
changing sources of program funds. CPI's original reliance
on Ford and CEO money with additional manpower funds from the
Federal Department of Labor changed significantly over the
years
. In 1 967 the Connecticut G-eneral Assembly established
the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) making the state a
full partner in local human renevfal initiatives. Eventually
DCA would become the primary source of community action funds,
providing the necessary seed money for CPI to decentralize
into neighborhood corporations.
^^Cleo Abraham, Urban City (New York: Carlton Press,
Inc., 1972), p. 9.
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In the meantime, the Board* of Education had gained a
high degree of internal sophistication in fund raising and in
1967 established the Office of Special Projects and Program
Planning specifically for that purpose. Consequently, the
school system began to rely more on its o\m resources and its
to generate financial support and less on CPI's estab-
lished role in that area. Still other events during the
transitional phase helped to further mitigate this reliance.
Even earlier than their action in 1967, the Connecticut
General Assembly passed Public Act 523 during a special ses-
sion in March, 1965. This bill, called the State Aid to Dis-
advantaged Children Act (SADC), provided SIO million to Con-
necticut's cities and toims for use in educating disadvantaged
children, By July, 1965, the Board of Education received
SADC funds, the first of some Si.
2
million during the 1965-67
biennium, to support programs previously supported by CPI con-
31trolled money; Shortly thereafter, in December, other money
from the Federal Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965 became
available to the school system, again for some of the same
programs V7hich CPI and the Board of Education had originated
^^CPI initiated this bill and vras instrumental in
mustering bipartisan political and community support for
its passage. See Chapter IV,
^^The Board of Education did not rely completely on CPI
funds for new programs. Ford, state, and federal sources re-
quired local matching for their grant awards. V/hile CPI par-
layed the use of private Ford funds as local matching to ac-
quire public state and federal money, the Board was contribut-
ing money from its budget. See Table 2:2.
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with financial support from CPI funds.
Financial independence inevitably dictated a change in
CPI-Board relations though not entirely in the sense that CPI
now became expendable due to the new sources of money. The
basic change which occurred was vjhat the coalition had been
all about, namely, institutional change to meet the needs of
a changing constituency. The major consequence of almost six
years of planning, cooperating, sharing, and struggling was
the establishment of a new self-reliance in the school system,
a demonstration of new resourcefulness. Then, too, by the
late 1960’s the school system was more accustomed to innova-
tion, accommodation, and change than it had been in 1962. A
signigicant turnover in teaching personnel in the system re-
sulted in the hiring of young, less experienced teachers not
indebted to the traditional system (Table 2:6). To the ex-
tent that traditionalism i.e. inability to adapt to change,
can be inferred through personnel turnover, leaves of absence,
resignations, and retirements peaked during the transitional
years 1967--1970 (Tables 2:7, 2:8).
A final factor encouraging the independence of the school
system and therefore, the breakdown of the coalition was the
impending change of superintendents . During the tenure of
the coalition, superintendents had been hired from outside
the system. On July 1, 1969, Gerald Barbaresi, a former
^^By CPI's accounting, this shifting period pushed
education substantially past manpower in CPI expenditure
categories: education consumed 56.6 percent of the ‘tojal
available funds to manpower's 52.6 percent in fiscal 1966.
CPI, The Human Story , 1967, p. 99.
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classroom teacher, community school principal, and associate
superintendent, took the office of superintendent. In 1962
when the coalition "began, Barharesi was a classroom teacher
in the system that desparately needed reform. Seven years
later, after serving various key roles in reform programs, he
achieved the highest leadership position in the system.
The transitional phase is significant, then, in terms of
the events which changed the reform coalition, as well as the
ascendency of new executives, and the adoption of a new oper-
ating style — institutionalized innovation — and philoso-
phy — decentralization — compatible with the changing times
and the demands of CPI’s and the Board of Education’s shared
constituency.
The Terminal Phase 1970-1972
As the end of the decade approached, the New Haven reform
coalition entered its final phase. The impact of the major
events discussed in the previous phase was fully realized
shortly after the beginning of the new decade. The major
characters originally responsible for the coalition had moved
on, leaving the commitment for others to manage. Resources
which were so critical for the support of the coalition con-
tinued to decrease. The Ford Foundation was no longer the
^^Sviridoff settled at the Ford Foundation barely a year
after taking the top position of New York City’s Human Re-
sources Administration; Mayor Lee retired; Paquin died of
cancer while superintendent of the Baltimore schools and
Hallman became a private, community action consultant in
Washington, D,C,
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angel
_ it had been. Austerity programs on the state level re-
sulted in severe cutbacks in supportive program categories
and funds. Even the state’s SADC aid to local school sys-
tems V7as cut.
Though the original coalition had dissipated greatly by
1970, residual effects and by-products perpetuate the coali-
tion's intent. The school system under the direction of
Superintendent Barbaresi assumed the role of innovator. The
system's efforts are discussed in Chapter III. CPI's role
has changed drastically through the decentralization process.
New neighborhood corporations have education committees whose
members participate on community school teams and school-
community councils, school advisory organizations composed of
students, school personnel, and parents (see Chapter IV). One
neighborhood, the Hill, is the designated Model Cities neigh-
borhood and therefore receives the benefit of additional fed-
eral money and local attention from the City Demonstration
Agency, a pro forma extension of the mayor's office. As this
is written, the city is planning to expand these benefits to
include the entire city.
In sum, however, CPI's initial role as an innovative
agent vjas completed by the end of the transitional phase. On
April 12, 1972, at the tenth anniversary banquet commemorating
the founding of CPI, barely a word was mentioned about CPI's
^^Starting V7ith an appropriation of S44.5 million in
1967, the state's Department of Community Affairs budget was
$32 million in 1970-71 and $24.5 million in 1971-72. The
proposed 1972-73 budget is $7.6 million. New Haven Register,
April 16, 1972.
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role in educational reform. The state of the nation's
economy and the myriad of circumstantial changes have re-
quired CPI to adhere strictly to a technical assistance func-
tion in the inner-city neighborhoods, except for some remain-
ing manpower training programs. But as this is being writ-
ten, the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity has been dis-
mantled leaving CPI and its fifty delegate agencies without
community action funds for the first time in ten years.
Superintendent Barbaresi has recently left New Haven.
The Board of Education, consisting of a new majority ap-
pointed by the present second term mayor, voted not to renew
Barbaresi 's contract when it was due to expire in July, 1973.
Barbaresi subsequently was offered and accepted an adminis-
trative position with the State Department of Education.
In regarding Barbaresi as expendable, the Board ignored
a groundswell of parent, teacher, and administrator support
demonstrated at a public hearing for Barbaresi. Political
motives seem apparent as the present mayor and Barbaresi have
not been on "good terms" (Barbaresi was appointed by Lee).
The reform coalition era thus ended in as much political con-
fusion and with the same inconclusive results that had char-
acterized its existence.
^^"CPI Given Death Sentence", New Haven Journal-Courier ,
February 6, 1973, p. 1. This article reported the CEO noti-
fication to CPI of the termination of community action funds
by June 30, 1973.
Backers Rally Behind Barbaresi," New Haven Register ,
March 14, 1972.
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CHAPTER III
THE EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISES OP A
COALITION REFORM STRATEGY
Educational reform as a thrust of human renewal in New
Haven took a substantive form which today may not appear to
be innovative, "progressive," or at all reformist. Under-
standing the context of change lends to the validity of local
institutional reform. A few years ago a small Texas city of
25,000 people put it more simply in its Model Cities applica-
tion. It said: "These (programs) may not be innovative
*1
elsex^here in the country but they certainly are for us."
In 1962 "business as usual" in New Haven's public schools
meant the use of outmoded facilities and a curriculum a gener-
ation old. Realistically, any departure from the educational
process institutionalized at that time represented reform
p
through simple change. With the advent of the Community Pro-
gress Inc.-Board of Education coalition, the intensity and
parameters of reform increased geometrically by virtue of the
additional public and private funds available and through the
mutual cooperation between these two organizations. The pur-
^H. Ralph Taylor, "The Model Cities Program: Educa-
tional Dimensions," in Education and Urban Renaissance , ed.
by Roald F. Campbell, et al., (New Yor£: John V/iley & Sons,
Inc., 1969), p. 25.
^The city's only evening and Sunday newspaper character-
ized the Ford grant proposal with the following headline:
"Blueprint for Ford Grant Here Borders on Revolutionary,"
New Haven Register, May 27, 1962.
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pose of this chapter is to survey the programs which re-
fi*om this coalition, noting the particular changes in
program emphasis throughout the ten-year period of the coali-
tion’s existence.
^
It would have heen easier, certainly more convenient, to
conduct this survey if the programmatic schema corresponded
neatly with the phases described in Chapter II. In fact, as
explained in that chapter, the phases themselves are not
clearly delineated by dates or, for that matter, programs.
Nevertheless, the consistency and perspective offered by the
phase treatment can still serve well here as a practical guide
to this survey.
The Formative Phase 1961-1962
There were no coalition-sponsored programs until late in
the formative phase, logically, this was a time for organiza-
tional planning, for formal and informal discussion, for the
identification of specific problem areas and remedial solu-
tions, and for the acquisition of sufficient resources. While
the school system assessed its capabilities and inventoried
its needs, the group planning CPI busied itself with devising
an educational agenda for community action. Superintendent-
elect Paquin supervised the educational program planning and
participated in the final negotiations for the initial S2.5
million Pord grant, of which approximately S1 million would be
3
spent on education.
^CPI, The Human Story. 1967 (New Haven; Community
Progress, Inc. , 1 967 ) , p. 41 .
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\j original focus of "blis ©ducaiional rofonn movomeii't
was the Community School concept. Adopted by the Board of
Education on the recommendations of its Education Task Force
and new superintendent in August, 1962, the Community School
concept identified the four essential roles of a school as
(1) an educational institution, (2) a neighborhood community
center, (3) a community service center, and (4) a center of
neighborhood life. The first two functions were tradition-
ally the responsibility of the Board of Education. They in-
cluded all educational programs for children and adults and
various cultural and recreational offerings. CPI was given
administrative responsibility for the latter two functions,
the establishment of the Community School as a center for
community services and as a base for neighborhood community
action. Figure 3:1 illustrates the CPI-Community School pro-
gram relationship.
FIGURE 3:1
THE COMMUHITY PROGRESS, INC .-COMMUNITY SCHOOL RELATIONSHIP
Community Progress. Inc. New Haven Public Schools
1/
Ford
Foundation
Funds
0 0
Anti-Poverty
Funds
“Special Programs
and Community
Action Programs
City Funds
State and
Federal Funds
Seven
Community Schools
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Organizationally, an assistant principal was appointed
in each of the seven schools to coordinate Conmmnity School
programs. Each assistant principal worked with a CPI neigh-
borhood services coordinator, a park department recreation
supervisor, and a volunteer agency group v^ork supeirvisor in
what was called the Community School team. The assistant
principals worked closely with their school principals and
their academic coimterparts hut were ultimately responsible
to a single Director of Community Schools, Ralph Goglia, who
was in turn responsible to the superintendents (See Figure
3:2).
FIGURE 3:2
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE
COMMUNITY SCHOOL PROGRAM
Actually CPI neighborhood service coordinators maintained
offices in each of the community schools.
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CPI delegated the first portion — $384,450 of Ford
money to the Board of Education for the community schools in
September, 1962, Within a year of its endorsement by the
Board, the Community School concept was established in seven
New Haven schools serving seven different neighborhoods.
\ A typical community school program consisted of a variety
of educational and recreational activities and resources which
addressed the needs of that particular neighborhood. Some
common programs included a pre-kindergarten program, a tutori-
al, informal education activities such as clubs, organized
recreational activities, and a groupwork program. The group-
work component was an attempt to service behavioral problems
which tended to affect academic achievement and social adjust-
ments. During the summer months, these activities were ex-
panded or underwent revision. By 1969 variations of these pro-
grams in five "satellite" community (elementary) schools sup-
plemented the offerings of the original seven schools.^
The Peak Phase 1963-1965
'^In addition to the four functions of the Community School
Program, funds from the Ford grant launched seven new programs
by early 1963: a pre-kindergarten program, a helping teacher
program, a higher horizons program, an improved reading pro-
gram, expanded guidance services, in-service training for
^For a thorough discussion and analysis of New Haven’s
community school program, see Dr. Henry Cameron's "The Story
of the Development of the Total Community School in the City
of New Haven, Connecticut For the Period 1962-1971" (unpu^
lished Ed.D, dissertation. University of Massachusetts, 1972).
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"teachers, and a new concept for smnmer school.^ These pro-
grams in some instances were part of the Community School
Program hut not always.
X The pre-k;indergarten program, a forerunner of OEO’s na-
tional Headstart Program, was intended to increase the like-
lihood of success in school for pre-school children whose
cultural "deprivation" created handicaps to normal school
achievement. A ten week pilot program started in April, 1963
and by September a full program involving six centers became
operative. Each center conducted four two-hour sessions
weekly for two groups of fifteen children. The program con-
sisted mainly of group singing, dancing, listening to stories,
and working with paint, clay, and sand. A fifth session was
devoted to the mothers and dealt with child-care, nutrition,
homemaking, and problem discussions. Each center was staffed
by a head teacher, a teacher’s aid, and a baby sitting at-
tendant. Part-time services of a parent-counselor, a visit-
ing nurse, a psychologist, and a pediatrician were also
available at no cost to the parents.
X In time the educational objectives of Headstart became
clearer and more sophisticated, encompassing language and so-
cial skill-building. Program components were aimed at en-
couraging interest in learning, developing good self concepts
^The treatment of these seven programs, unless otherwise
noted, is based on information contained in: Community Pro-
gress, Inc., Hew Haven Youth Development Program Part Tw^
ProgrPirns (New Haven: CPI,
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in pre-schoolers, and "building self-confidence.
The initial pilot program grew to 210 enrollees in seven
centers hy 1964 and then to 600 enrollees in 20 centers by
1968. Financial support of the program shifted from Ford to
OEO vrhen the National Headstart Program began. In 1969 the
state’s Department of Community Affairs augmented the OEO,
ESEA, and SADC support of the city—wide network of centers,^
The reading program was designed to reduce reading fail-
ure in the very early stages and to provide special assistance
where reading retardation was apparent and remedial work re-
quired. One supervisor and tvrelve reading consultants and
teachers serviced all thirty-one elementary schools and a
special junior high school developmental reading program for
grades seven through nine.
J Since studies in the New Haven school system indicated
that underachievement in reading was a major cause of many
problems at all levels, from the primary grades through high
school, an intensified reading program had to involve most
classroom teachers in order to have an impact on all the school
system's poor readers. The reading specialists developed and
conducted workshops for all teachers on the primary, junior,
and high school levels, in addition to providing the training
of teachers in the developmental reading program.
y The Helping Teacher Program, later named the Curriculum
Assistants Program, started in February, 1963. The program!
^Supplemental Education in New Haven , comp, by Ad Hoc
Cnmn-ittee on Supplemental Education, February, 1969» p. 7.
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was designed in response to problems caused by the increasing
turnover of teachers in the inner-city schools, a full thirty-
five percent in 1961. Emphasis was placed on structuring ex-
periences for new teachers and strengthening teacher support.
Some nine curriculum assistants in seven inner-city elementary
schools v:ere charged with assisting principals in the orienta-
tion of new teachers; they also presented and demonstrated nevj
instructional materials to regular classroom teachers, as-
sisted teacher planning, and conferred with teachers and par-
ents about individual pupil achievement and advancement. Most
curriculum assistants were highly skilled, successful class-
room teachers who were reassigned to the program.
A fourth new program,'^he Higher Horizons Program, was
developed to introduce students and their parents to new cul-
tural and social resources in Hew Haven, to new interests, new
inter-personal relationships and as a result, to stimulate
them to higher aspirations. Like several other programs.
Higher Horizons began on an experimental basis in February,
1963 . Its program consisted of trips, demonstrations in art
and music, multi-cultural activities, and dramatic perform^
ances for children in kindergarten through sixth grade levels.
The program attempted to reinforce and expand upon the work of
the pr©-hindergarten program, though initially it took a few
years for pre-kindergarten graduates to transfer into Higher
Horizons
.
The trial program proved to be so successful that it was
expanded to include two of the four junior high schools and
five elementary schools. Teacher involvement increased
from
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twenty-two to seventy-five in two years and eventually some
2 1 000 students participated in the program,
Y Responding to a recommendation of the Education Task
Force, the Board of Education established a new Department of
Itipil Services to coordinate a systematic, comprehensive pro-
gram utilizing the services of guidance counsellors, school
social workers, psychologists, and the entire school staff.
The department conducted studies to determine the nature of
student problems, grade failures, and reasons for dropping
out, A new system of reliable guidance data, including voca-
tional information, was developed. Another phase of the pro-
gram provided in-service staff training in the form of semin-
ars, lectures, and group discussions which centered on the
urban community, its social and economic changes and related
youth problems. Still another phase involved student-coun-
selor field trips to acquaint both groups with new and chang-
ing opportunities in the local labor market.
In sum, the establishment of the Pupil SeiTvices Program
provided for a host of aids and critical guidance services to
students and training opportunities for staff in an effort to
bridge the staff competence and student communications gaps
which existed in 1 962
.
Though most programs were designed to offer in-service
training in specialized areas, a systeio-wide in-service edu-
cation program was established to develop, conduct, and co-
ordinate general in-service training. This program had two
basic objectives:
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1 . to develop a better imderstanding among
staff members of the full scope of the
education program so as to encourage im-
plementation of its parts;
2. to provide staff with more details of
the economic and social structure of the
community and the special problems of
the inner-city.
7
Half day training programs for all school staff dealt with
topics such as pupil growth, art and music programs, CPI and
its relationship to the schools, the goals and programs of
the Human Relations Council and the Urban League, the educa-
tion of the American teacher, and other community topics.
Participants assisted in starting a curriculum materials
center and a professional library. Staff members also at-
tended selected regional, state, and national education con-
ferences; others visited various urban school systems and
community programs, and some participated in local community
welfare projects.
The last of the original programs was a new summer school
program. Its purpose was to offer students from grades foiir
through twelve learning situations where students and teachers
were free from the tensions which too often come from marks,
report cards, examinations, and credit. Consequently, the
summer school curriculum allowed students to explore fields
of knowledge not generally taught in the regular school pro-
gram in a more informal and relaxed atmosphere. These cir-
cumstances also enabled teachers to experiment with new tech-
'^Community Progress, Inc., Second ^ual Program Review
for the Ford Foundation. 1963-1 964 > p. b«
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niques and to refine others for incorporation into the regu-
lar school program.
Almost 2,000 students participated in the first summer
school program in 1963. That number increased to 4,622 in
1966 and to a peak of over 5,000 in 1967. With budget cuts
and reduced course offerings, summer school enrollment has
since decreased.
Not all programs which began during the peak phase vrere
the product of, or intimately dependent on, the CPI-Board of
Education relationship. Others had begun prior to the estab-
lishment of CPI but found essential financial support to con-
tinue in the CPI commitment to education. And still others
were developed from the original programs but evolved new ob-
jectives and structures. Because the criteria for categor-
izing these programs is tenuous, if not entirely obscure, it
is necessary simply to treat each program independently, pro-
viding sufficient information for each to be placed in the
overall framework.
One of CPI’s first attempts at educational programming
V7as the CPI Work Crew Program (in 1965 renamed the Neighbor-
hood Youth Corps Out of School) . In 1 963 Mitchell Sviridoff
supervised the development of this program to provide unenH
ployed high school dropouts work experience, work-related
education, counselling, basic education, and a modest income.
The program consisted of three vfork-study stages during which
a participant received educational and vocational training
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eventually leading to a full-time job.®
In 1965 CPI and the Board of Education sponsored the
Hi^ School Work Training Program or the Neighborhood Youth
Corps In School. This program was aimed at high school stu-
dents from low income families who were potential dropouts.
Participants worked twelve hours a week after school and re-
ceived a reasonable hourly wage. The goal of the program was
to keep these students in school and ease their transition
into the labor market by increasing their skills and confi-
dence through work experience.
A CPI-supported program of a similar nature was the U.S.
Grant Foundation. The Foundation was actually a Yale student
program organized in 1953 to assist local black students in
preparing for college. An Upward Bound-type of program, it
admitted students in the sixth grade and continued with them
until they started college. CPI supported the summer program
phase until 1968 when Title III funds were obtained through
ESEA.
The New Haven School System also contributed to the pro-
gram picture. The Adult Basic Education Program was a Board
of Education program funded from 1 963 to 1 965 by CPI-Ford
funds. It provided New Haven adults basic academic instruc-
tion and an introduction to cultural appreciation. A large
portion of its students were non-English-speaking inner-city
residents.
At least three single experimental programs were planned
®Ad Hoc Committee, Supplemental Education , p. 19.
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d-uring this phase thoiAgh only one was eventually implemented.
The psycho-education experiment was a program established
in two schools under the direction of Dr. Seymour Sarason of
Yale University. The program provided a psychologist for
classroom use in the two schools. Problems of individual
students could be observed, assessed, and remedied by the
psychologist in cooperation with the classroom teacher. The
services can .aid multi-problem school situations in the cor-
rection of poor school adjustment.
The fifth and sixth grade program was an experiment de-
signed to prevent school dropout and raise pupil achievement
levels in selected inner-city elementary schools. Central to
the program was the organization of elementary schools in
clusters of three and the shared use of facilities in each
cluster. This was also to enable the school system to achieve
a better racial balance throughout its elementary schools.
The program never reached the implementation stage due to the
superceding city-wide integration plan.
The seventh and eighth grade program with parental par-
ticipation was another experimental program planned but not
implemented. It was to involve seventh and eighth grade stu-
dents (in two of the innei^city K-8 schools) and their parents
The hypothesis was that there is a direct relationship between
the aspirations of parents and those of their children. Par-
ents placed as observers in classrooms of their children could
later have common discussions with teachers and their children
together or separately.
- In 1962 a study found that one-fourth of Nevr Haven’s
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i
S’bud.Gii'ts enrolled in the seventh grade were dropping out of
school before finishing; sixty-five percent of all inner-city
students were leaving school before the eleventh grade; tiren-
ty-three percent by the ninth grade (See Table 3:1).
TABLE 3:1
f STUDENT DROP OUT RATES BY GRADES
A NEW HAVEN PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
^ 1962-63
Grade 7 8 9 10 11 12
^Dropouts 0.4 1.1 4.2 9.5 7.5 3.7
Source: CPI, New Haven Youth Development Program, Part Two:
Progr^s
,
October I 963 . Chap. V. p. 18.
Subsequently single curriculum (also called individualized
educational planning) was designed to curb the dropout rate
in the seventh, eighth, and ninth grades. Through these three
grades the program offered each pupil an individualized pro-
gram which reflected the pupil’s interests and ability. A
form of flexible scheduling enabled pupils to maintain a more
personalized school schedule.
The school system recognized the need for new and up-
dated vocational education. A joint education and training
program was developed to meet the needs of students who lack
ability, interest, or motivation for regular school programs.
Luring the 1963—64 school year, forty students, ten from each
junior high school, were assigned to four self-contained
classrooms with four carefully selected teachers. The pro-
gram stressed social learning —— informal education, inter-
personal relations, self-learning — ra-ther than strict aca-
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demic study. Teachers and students utilized the supportive
services of guidance, reading, social work, health and psy-
chological services.
Because of the increasing numbers of students desiring
vocational and technical programs, high school pre-vocational
and pre-technical programs were critically needed. The State
Department of Vocational Education conducted four training
programs during the 1964 summer in auto mechanics, drafting,
printing, and general machinery. In the fall, pre-vocational
and pre-technical students chose school curricula based upon
their summer experiences.
Work study programs supplied practical vocational ex-
perience while students continued their academic programs, A
pilot project at one junior high school hired potential drop-
outs as aides to work a maximum of ten hours a week at seventy-
five cents an hour. Ninth grade boys participated in furni-
ture repair, landscaping, painting, glazing, and clerking.
Ninth grade girls worked as aides to teachers, dieticians,
librarians, and school office personnel.
Study clinics represented a final offering in this pro-
gram phase. The clinics, available for study and tutoring,
were open two nights a week in each senior high school from
seven to nine at night. In addition the seven community
schools had tutoring programs during the afternoons and even-
ings. Attendance was voluntary though some students attended
by guidance counselor referral.
This broad scheme of programs represents the initial
planning effort by the members of the Department of Education
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in New Haven and CPI. Pew, if any, of these programs could
have been possible without the infusion of outside money,
particularly from the Ford Foundation. As described in the
previous chapter, towards the end of the peak phase of the
coalition, new fimding sources dictated a change in the rela-
tionship betvfeen the Board of Education and CPI; however,
many programs originally implemented became institutionalized
while others became inoperative. The coalition's denouement
during the transitional phase had little effect on changing
the fundamental commitment to the programs developed and I'm-
plemented earlier.
The Transitional Phase 1966-1969
By late 1965 and early 1966
,
the time period which cor-
responds roughly to the change from the peak phase to the
transitional phase, the programmatic scheme was altered some-
what. In 1966 all CPI programs relating to Community Schools
were transferred to the Board of Education. The coalition
members planned new programs, expanded existing programs, and
eliminated others. Basically, it attempted to maintain its
most successful programs and extend them through new funding
sources
.
The new programs were the Long V/harf Program, Residential
Youth Centers, the High School Enrichment Program, and the
School Library Services Program. Programs which were by-
products or variations of existing programs were the Summer
Headstart Program, the Summer Institute for Teachers, and the
Educational Research Project. Discontinued programs included
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the joint education and training program, and the indivi-
dualized instruction and guidance program for grades seven
through nine which ended after the 1965~66 school year; the
fifth and sixth grade program and seventh and eighth grade
program for pupils and parents were never implemented.^
Under the new program category, the long VJharf Program
attempted to demonstrate the viability of theater as an in-
strument to raise the motivation of inner-city youth with
respect to learning in general and language skills in particu-
lar. The repertoire company in residence at the Long VJharf
Theatre was instrumental in providing material for inner-city
high school and elementary school students and in conducting
workshops with school drama groups.
In September, 1966, the doors opened on the first Resi-
dential Youth Center (RYC), fimded as a demonstration project
by the Department of Labor. The RYC vias a neighborhood-based,
self-help residential center for inner-city boys age 16-21.
The program was an out—growth of the Neighborhood Youth Corps
started in 1963 for high school dropouts. RYC, like NYC,
used indigenous non-professionals as staff but added the
residential dimension for boys needing a non- institutional
^Infoimation contained in this paragraph
^
and those on
new programs is derived from: New Haven Public Schools,
’•Backp-round Paper for Meeting Between Members of the New Haven
Board*^of Education and Members of the CPI Board^^d their
Residents' Advisory Committee," November 14, 1966.
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yet clinical setting, The program drev; on many social
services in Nevx Haven including a formal relationship with
the Yale Psycho-Educational Clinic.
The high school enrichment program consisted of a series
of Saturday morning lectures for area high school students.
Topics covered political philosophies, civil rights, U.S.
foreign policy, painting, jazz and folk music as art forms,
and the cinema.
The most ambitious of the new programs was the library
service project. It established a division of school li-
brary services which facilitated the development of five new
libraries in elementary schools and supplemented the collec-
tions of nine additional existing school libraries. The di-
vision also established neighborhood library instruction
centers, a central resource collection and bookmobile, and a
training program in the use of library resources for teachers,
1
1
students, library aides, and study center leaders.
The summer institute for teachers, first held in 1966,
was in fact an extension of the in-service training effort in
the original scheme of programs. This institute for 100
teachers focused on the education of disadvantaged students.
Finally, a new educational research project attempted
Ira Goldenberg, Build Me a Mountain; Youth, Poy-
ertv and* the Creation of New Settings (Cambridge, Massachu-
seifel—The MIT Press, p. VI 7 A compelling account
and scholarly analysis of a community action enterprise.
^^New Haven Board of Education and Community Progress,
Inc
. ,
Education Programs P.L. 89-10 (Title I) and Publ^
Act 52^. 19bb-l966, Oec-bion b, p. ird.
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"to establish reorganized system or research instruments in the
fourteen poverty impacted schools which were receiving more
than three million dollars in special aid during 1965-1967.
project was designed to maintain a standardized, compu-
ter-based system of data collection, storage, retrieval and
analysis on the programs affecting these schools. The data
could be used to provide a basis for evaluation in long range
decision-making and planning.
In the time vrhich elapsed from the start of the reform
coalition until well into the transitional phase, the tendency
of those involved in the programs described above was most
certainly to support the more successful of the programs im-
plemented. Those programs which were eliminated or phased
out were ostensibly absorbed by other programs or simply
deemed unworkable or no longer necessary. Other programs
w^hich were never implemented appeared to be the likely victims
of an arbitrary priority system suffering from over programr-
ming.
The Terminal Phase 1970-1972
The terminal phase is by definition the end of the coali-
tion reform movement. In the absence of a planning and re-
source catalyst like CPI, innovations and new educational
enterprises must generally be generated from within the sys-
tem, i.e,, institutionalized. Though during the transitional
and terminal phases, surrogate agents, which will be dis-
cussed in Chapter IV, contributed to fill a growing void left
by CPI's changing role.
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One of the more remarkable programs established in the
1969-70 school year was the Neighborhood Guidance Center.
This project was designed to offer an informal but parallel
school program to the segment of students conveniently labeled
as disruptive. Because of their inability to function within
the more rigid, traditional school programs, these students
were being expediently subjected to suspension from school.
The Neighborhood Guidance Center, located in a former syna-
gogue not far from one of the high schools, offered these
students an interim school setting where they could adapt to
a program of self-discipline and academic study. The program
lasted only one year due to funding difficulties and internal
political factors.
Another example was the high school in the community
(HSC), an innovative alternative to the standard high school.
Established at the beginning of the 1970-71 school year, HSC
consisted of 10 full time teachers and 150 students. Students,
chosen at random from applicants, were offered the following
opportunity
;
A chance to take educational advantage of the
great human and physical resources of New Haven.
HSC classes are held at locations throughout the
city, as often as possible at places relevant to
the courses involved,
A chance to take a wide variety of courses in
small class settings. There are five to ten
students in a typical high school in the com-
munity class.
A chance to develop their own individual courses
of study. The program hopes to find out what a
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student needs and vrants and to v7ork with him
on achieving his goals J
2
Still another program, Focus, which had its philosophical
roots planted in the early coalition years continues to be a
primary ongoing project of the Board of Education. Focus*
purpose is to provide a concentrated program of reading, math,
and language arts for students in inner-city primary grades.
The program involves instruction for students on an individual
and small group basis and similarly for teachers in develop-
ing relevant curriculum materials. ^ Focus receives ESEA
funds through Title I.
This chapter cannot be concluded without some mention of
a CPI relationship to non-public schools. As a private, non-
profit corporation, CPI’s status provided a useful link to
the non-public school. V/hile most of the resources of the
public school programs were available to parochial school stu-
dents, CPI nevertheless facilitated an CEO grant for a pre-
Kindergarten program at St. Martin de Porres, a parochial
school, the first instance of this in the country. In addi-
tion CEO monies through CPI were used by parochial schools to
provide individualized reading assistance to their pupils and
^New Haven Public Schools, High School in the Community
A Basic Description (New Haven: The Advocate Press, n.d.),
p. 1 .
^
^A recent evaluation by the University of Coi^ecticut
found the "majority of children in the program during the
last academic year were achieving at a level comparable ^^j'ch
national norms and equally important, target populations have
also shovjn substantial academic growth." New Haven
December 1972, p. 17c.
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i^—s6rvic6 ©ducaijiGn program for fheir regular school
teachers. This is further evidence that the spirit of commit-
ment of CPI's reform philosophy penetrated beyond sacred cows
in an attempt to deal with the problems of poverty.
All the programs described above, however radical or mun-
dane they may seem, could not have been at all possible if
there had not been 1 ) a motivating catalyst to initiate them,
2) sufficient additional resources to implement and support
them, and 3) the basic willingness and accommodation on the
part of those individuals and the system for whom change was
most difficult. It is not a purpose of this study to evaluate
or even report on the effectiveness of the programs which re-
sulted from this reform coalition. It should suffice at this
point to say that the mood created in 1962, the innovative
atmosphere, was responding to new and changing social and eco-
nomic demands; that mood persisted and continues to persist
in a system not wholly adverse to the lethargy of bureau-
cratization. The singular achievement of these educational
enterprises or programs i.e. their establishment, meant a
departure from all that was previously held sacred under a
monolithic philosophy of education. The clear departure from
that philosophy constituted a commitment to new ways of
learning for all.
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CHAPTER IV
COMMUNITY ACTION VEHICLES FOR RESIDENT
PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATIONAL DECISION-MAKING
Decision-making is a fnnction of power or authority.
Classically, power within an institutional hierarchy cor-
responds proportionally to an inverted pyramid, whereas the
number of people affected by that accumulative power cor-
responds to a regular pyramid. The point is simple: most
people whose lives are affected by institutions — and that
is most people — have little, if anything, to say in the in-
stitutional decisions which directly or indirectly govern
their lives
. In 1 962 this was as true for the nation in gen-
eral as it was for New Haven.
With the added benefit of hindsight, identification of
the inherent social problem is rather easy; dysfunctional
public institutions quite naturally breed public discontent
and usually require reform. The impetus for such reform can
be provided by public pressure, a catalytic form of power, or
the basis can be generated or formed by public assumption of
the institution’s power and responsibilities, i.e., local or
community control. Restated, these alternatives can consti-
tute the necessary means of political pressure or political
control.
In 1962 Community Progress, Incorporated explicitly set
out to reform local institutions, with educational reform as
a major objective. It did not seek to institute a new system
of participation in local government. National as well as
local events and circumstances (as described in Chapter II)
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controlled the direction of CPI and its reform coalition after
its auspicious beginning. During his tenure as executive di-
rector, the politically astute Mitchell Sviridoff was remark-
ably successful in anticipating social trends and maintaining
CPI’s strategy as a national model. V/hile it is obvious that
CPI's planners were aware of the political dimensions of New
Haven's social institutions, it is equally obvious that they
underestimated the social role of education in that regard.
They could have benefitted from what Christopher Jencks wrote
just a few years later:
, . . the social role of education is at bottom
a political rather than a technical question.
Schools . . , can play a major role in solving
America's social problems only if control over
them passes to new individuals and interests
who expect to benefit from solving these prob-
lems . '
The experience of the CPI—Board of Education reform coa-
lition was, as has been indicated, marked by various forms of
achievement. The programmatic substance of that relationship
may seem to lack the gleam of innovation; yet the more subtle,
innovative achievement which developed through a curious mix-
ture of political strategy and circumstance stands distinctly
in support of any evaluation of CPI, the Board of Education,
or their relationship. The political strategy consisted of a
conscious attempt to invoke neighborhood or resident partici-
pation in the planning, implementation, and operation of
neighborhood programs through the use of community action
^Christopher Jencks, "
The Radical Papers , ed. by
Books, 19bb), p. zll .
The Future of American Education,
Irving Howe (New York: Anchor
tt
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vehicles. National and local events acted as an uncontroll-
able variable, reshaping the political strategy, speeding it
up at times, redirecting it, and even reconstituting it. The
following chapter is a treatment of community action vehicles
and their use in an educational reform coalition.
Participatory vehicles played an historical role as v:ell
as a functional one throughout the time line of the coalition.
However, the vehicles discussed in this chapter are more sig-
nificant in their functional aspect, rather than in their tem-
poral one. In other words, the relevance of community action
vehicles in Nevx Haven’s context lies mainly in their level and
type of activity as a measurement of participation. Conse-
quently, though historical incidence vrill not be ignored, em-
phasis will be placed upon function.
It is necessary at this point to attempt a definition of
a community action vehicle. Clark and Hopkins’ A Relevant War
Against Poverty offers a useful definition for this purpose.
In defining community action, the authors conclude it must;
involve the development and use of techniques
whereby the victims of poverty, social in-
justice, or some form of exploitation and dis-
crimination are organized to identify their
problems, determine the sources and causes,
mobilize their energies, resources, _ and col-
lective power in seeking and obtaining remr-
edies and the desired changes.^ (Emphasis
added
.
)
This chapter is concerned with those ’’techniques.” Further-
^Kenneth B. Clark and Jeannette Hopkins, A Relevant War
Against Poverty: A Study of C ommunity Action Pryrams
'Observable' Social Change (Hew Ifork: Harper ana itow, 1968),
p. 23.
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more, "victims" in the above definition takes on the addi-
tional dimension of education clientele. Specifically, this
refers to the poor who are a target population of the anti-
poverty agency and also users of the education system.
Community Action Vehicles and Community Progress, Inc.
CPI's experience with participatory vehicles began with
its articles of incorporation. Formation of a board of direc-
tors an essential first step in establishing the agency.
The agency's planners decided that a nine member board could
adequately serve the needs and coalition variants of the re-
form strategy. The makeup of the board was clearly indicative
of the ground work laid for the agency's success. The nine
member board consisted of representatives from the New Haven
Board of Education, Mayor Lee's Citizen's Action Commission,
the. Community Council, the New Haven Redevelopment Agency, the
United Fund, Yale University, and three public members ap-
pointed by the Mayor, Serving for three years (the term of
the Ford grant), the original board members represented or-
ganizations and institutions with a prior vested interest,
direct or indirect, in the agency's planning effort. Hence
the board's participatory function v:as originally conceived
as being highly restrictive and neatly perfunctory. At least
one writer has labeled the board (to no one's astonishment)
"a legitimating device," noting that there was no provision
for the voice of the poor or other clientele,
^Russell Murphy, Political Entrepreneurs and Urban Pov-
erty (Lexington, Mass. "I D.C
.
Heath and Co , , 1 971 ) » p7 40 .
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When in the fall of 1 964 the Economic Opportunity Act
took effect j "participation" gained new meaning and concomi-
tant momentum. The words "maximum feasible participation"
constituted a loosening wedge in the narrowly defined process
devised by CPI, Thus, more flexible vehicles were necessary,
CPI, much to its constant fiscal advantage, was especially
adept at anticipating governmental action and therefore could
respond posthaste not only with written proposals requesting
funds but also with rationales and local initiatives to just-
ify itself,"^ Consequently steps were taken early in 1965 to
plan for increased neighborhood involvement in agency deci-
sion-making, The first step was a benevolent attempt by CPI
to rationalize informal inputs of the poor in the agency's
decision-making processes,-"^ The second step was to begin
groundwork on a new advisory body eventually called the Resi-
dent's Advisory Committee,
The Resident's Advisory Committee was designed to be an
^Much credit for this is due to CPI's national leader-
ship role as a model community action program and the frequent
participation of its administrators in determining federal
anti-poverty policy.
^CPI, "Special Report: Involvement of the Poor in New
Haven's Community Action Program," 1965.
A previous attempt is located in CPI's first proposal to
OEO The proposal emphasizes CPI's decentralized program
structure throughout the inner city in community schoop,
ployment centers, neighborhood offices, and store fronts. I
also stressed the number of indigenous program staff members
and the involvement of "generalized neighborhood org^iza-
tions" and "specific program related groups." In a
phetic statement, the proposal asserts: "It
Lck through resident involvement) is a process that oonttoues
and grows as neighborhood competence develops.
cation for Community Action Program Grant, November 17,
19 4,
CAP 3, P. 28.
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explicit advisory mechanism for resident participation with
^plicit fmictions
. The twenty—one member council —
— three
members elected from each of seven neighborhoods ~ was "to
3- major role in counseling CPI on programs of activity
• • According to Sviridoff, "that might include advising
the Board (CPi) on the feelings and reactions of the neigh-
borhood residents regarding CPI programs and suggestions for
new programs or modifications.""^ A former CPI employee, and
critic of the agency’s resident participation efforts, com-
mented later:
The Residents Advisory Council /iic7 vras laimched
with no specific functions, no direction, and no
future. Minutes of their meetings for the first
year showed they were still undecided on their
functions. For example, November 8 minutes showed
they voted unanimously to postpone a proposed
joint meeting with the CPI Board of Directors to
consider the question of the former's function.
On November 25, a discussion of the committee's
functions followed. A member offered a motion
that the CPI Board be asked to submit an outline
of the committee's functions. He withdrew it
after several committee members voiced opinion
that the committee should meet with the CPI
Board to discuss the matter.®
The same critic points out that the RAC's original mem^
bership included everyone but the poor (Table 4:1). He claims
^Statement by Reuben Holden, President, CPI Board of
Directors, New Haven Register , November 9, 1965.
"^Statement by Mitchell Sviridoff, Executive Director,
CPI, New Haven Register , November 9, 1965.
^Edward Cohen, "New Haven Inner-City Citizen Participa-
tion: The Community Action Agency's Role in Neighborhood
Councils" (Unpublished M.S. thesis. Southern Connecticut
State College, 1971), p. 52.
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TABLE 4:1
FIRST RESIDENT ADVISORY COMILETTEE (1965)
BY NEIGHBORHOOD AND OCCUPATION
Neighborhood Occupation
Dixuell
1 . real estate, property manager
2. college student
3. president of PTA
Dwight 1 . labor relations specialist
2 . machinist
3. assistant librarian
Pair Haven 1 . factory inspector
2. mechanical engineer
3 . salesman
Newhallville 1 . commercial fuel operator
2. housewife (member of CORE)
3. material control operator
West Rock 1
.
president of PTA
2 . shipping clerk
3. homemaking adviser
Wooster Square 1 , insurance agent
( 2. Redevelopment Agency employee
3. housewife (member of PTA)
Note: The seventh neighborhood, the Hill, did not hold
elections until after the original council convened.
That occupational data was unobtainable by this
author
.
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the election procedure was devised to allow for minimum ac-
cessability by all people, e.g. prearranged candidates, voting
by invited residents at meetings. Fewer than 500 people
and as few as fourteen voted in one neighborhood in the
CPI supervised elections.^
Such criticisms, well taken as they may be in relation
to the inner-city poor, still obscure an unavoidable fact:
regardless of the ground rules, systematic steps, developed
and implemented in gradual piecemeal fashion, vrere involving
people who had up to that time been excluded from any formal
input into the agency’s decision-making. Interest in the RAC
waned throughout its first year until almost exactly on the
anniversary of its first meeting, a group of members boosted
by neighborhood support issued a manifesto reasserting its
neighborhood legitimacy and demanding approval pov^ers for CPI
programs and policies. This action heralded the beginning of
a new definition of participation, one defined through neigh-
borhood initiative.
CPI took another step to involve neighborhood residents
in its policy-making structure at the same time it was foster-
ing the development of the RAC. Feedback to CEO had aroused
federal skepticism with CPI's definition of "maximum feasible
participation." Perhaps because of CPI's reputation, CEO ex-
pected CPI to be more exemplary in its progress. In any case
the direct result was a move on November 12, 1965» by the CPI
Board of Directors to expand its total membership from nine
^Ibid.
,
p. 50.
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"to six'te6n, on© addiiiioiicLl insnibGr "to b© ©l©c"b©d p©r n©ighbor—
hood by th© r©sid©nts. This mov© pr©-dat©d th© Gr©©n Am©nd-
m©nt to th© Economic Opportunity Act by throe years. That
amendment mandated one—third board representation by resi-
dents.
The two simnltaneous efforts suggest that CPI was seek-
ing to further explore tv7o forms of procedural resident in-
volvement — cooperative and self-sustaining. Cooperative
participation refers to the institutional, i.e, CPI, accommo-
dation of residents to an expanded board of directors, al-
though initially in numbers insufficient to provide a voting
majority. Self-sustaining participation is represented by
the Residents Advisory Committee which remained a flexible
vehicle for self-determination according to neighborhood in-
itiatives. A truism of practical politics holds that in the
transfer of power, povrer cannot be given but must be taken.
That the RAC floundered its o^.m demand for power can be con-
stimed as evidence to that truism.
Participation in decision-making also has an operational
meaning. Within CPI's Community Services Division, the opera-
tional arm most involved in the Community School Program, par-
ticipation was a primary objective. An early document out-
lined the intent of the division’s neighborhood services of-
fices as participatory vehicles:
1 , To develop responsible leadership with
'
concern for the neighborhood and with
awareness of its problems.
2. To develop and strengthen participation
in neighborhood organizations.
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3. To enco-urage citizen initiative in
program planning.
4. To promote full use of the community
school as a community center,
5. To educate residents to constructive
use of their rights and neighborhood re-
sources.
6. To encourage the raising of indivi-
dual and neighborhood aspirations.^^
Multi-service community service offices first operated in the
schools serving as community schools. For various reasons,
the offices later shifted to store front facilities. CPI
workers and programs in each of Hew Haven's inner-city neigh-
borhoods sought to implement the above roles by encouraging
residents to participate in programming and to organize for
community development.
The accelerated redefinition of resident participation
and the participatory movement itself entered the most criti-
cal stage in the summer of 1967 (see Chapter II, p. 50).
Well-worn institutional rationales and delays were ultimately
consumed in the chaos and retribution of riots in Hew Haven
that summer. There can be no denial that the trauma result-
ing from the "civil disturbances" in the nation's leading
model city exacted an irreversible commitment by CPI and the
Board of Education to the community's definition of partici-
pation, The report of the national Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders concluded:
Ghetto resident increasingly believe that
they are excluded from the decision-making
"'^CPI, "Second Annual Program Review for the Ford Founda-
tion 1963-1964," neighborhood Services section, p.3.
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process which, affects "their lives and commimity
,
This feeling of exclusion, intensified hy the
hitter legacy of racial discrimination, has en-
gendered a deep-seated hostility toward the in-
stit'utions of government. It has severely com-
promised the effectiveness of programs intended
to provide improved services to ghetto residents.
In part, this is the lesson of Detroit and
Ne't7 Haven where well-intentioned programs de-
signed to respond to the needs of ghetto resi-
dents were not worked out and implemented s'uf—
ficiently in cooperation with the intended
beneficiaries . ^ ^
In the months after the riots, CPI brainstormed a strat-
egy consistent with the immediate social dictates made evident
the previous s-ummer. A vague notion of decentralization
emerged in agency pronouncements throughout the winter and
spring. In May, 1968, the CPI Board of Directors with its
complement of neighborhood representatives adopted a resolu-
tion stating that the agency's new policy was to foster the
creation of neighborhood corporations. The decision-making
process would be broadened through decentralization and neigh-
borhood residents would be invested with the authority and
responsibility for planning and implementing programs that
1 2
affect their lives.
Decentralization was the fundamental process identified
by CPI as necessary to transform its centralized, decision-
making bureaucracy into a diffused system of stable, self-
11 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,
ort of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
ew York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 28b.
^^CPI, "Proced'ures and Guidelines for Designation of ^
Neighborhood Corporations, A Working Paper of the CPI Divi-
'^ion Leaders in Preparation for Making Recommendations to
the CPI Board Regarding Designation of Neighborhood
Corpora-
tions," n.d. , p. 1
.
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d.6i/6i*iiiiiiiLiig orgajiiza"fcioiis
, Tli6 noighlDorliood corpora."bion
would be the model umbrella organization (Table 4:1) at the
community level, with the responsibility for performing the
same functions which CPI had previously performed, e.g.
identification of neighborhood needs, development and imple-
mentation of programs. ^ By decentralizing into neighborhood
corporations, the number of centers of decision-malcing and
the number of initiators of policy are increased; people are
directly engaged in the function, thereby increasing the
awareness of individuals of the whole function in which they
%
are involved and establishing as much face-to-face associa-
1
4
tion vrith decision makers as possible.
At the outset, corporations took one of two basic forms.
The first was a multi-purpose organization responsible for
planning and screening program proposals and for being a
neighborhood "voice" in matters of community concern. The
second was a collection of single-purpose groups which, under
the aegis of the umbrella corporation, would act to meet needs
in specific program areas. Both forms are embodied operation-
ally in the Figure 4:1 schematic; however, combinations of
the forms varied from neighborhood to neighborhood.
Because it was CPI's commitment to "encourage" the neigh-
borhood corporation concept as its final community action
^^CPI, "Neighborhood Corporations Proposal, Revised
Draft," Au^st 12, 1969, p. 1-
^^Paul Goodman, "Notes on Decentralization," in^
Radical Papers , Irving Howe, ed. (New York: Anchor Books,
1 966 ) , p . V90 .
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vehicle, CPI staff recognized tv7o alternative ways to proceed:
CPI could manage the formation of corporations in each neigh-
borhood by providing organizers and training, or it could en-
courage independent local initiative in each neighborhood.^^
The latter alternative prevailed for its inherent political
implications: not only would CPI avoid charges of paternalism
which had plagued it since 1962, but the transfer of power —
control over fimds and programs — could be accomplished to
any independent resident organization or cluster of such
groups which demonstrated neighborhood-wide representation.
The self-determination alternative was equally important:
after several years of operating programs and piecemeal inputs
of token participation. New Haven's inner-city residents were
experienced enough with formal institutions to -undertake the
basic task of governing and serving themselves.
By 1 972 neighborhood corporations v/ere in operation in
each of New Haven's geographic neighborhoods. CPI continues
to maintain a technical assistance service, primarily to meet
funding requirements.
CoTHmunity Action Vehicles and the Board of Education
Community action vehicles within the education system in
New Haven are perhaps indistinguishable from those in many
other cities. It has only been in recent years that the ac-
cumulative effects of crisis confrontation, neighborhood in-
itiative, and larger social trends have prodded the system
^^CPI, "Neighborhood Corporations Proposal," p. 4-.
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into developing real, meaningful participatory vehicles. On
the whole, there had been no regular involvement of parents
and teachers in deciding educational policy before the late
1960's. ^<fhatever involvement there had been resulted from
some crisis within the system or v^ithin a particular school.
For example the Hillhouse Ad Hoc Parent's Committee fomned
(December, 1967) as a response to the high school's racial dis-
turbances. One experienced Hew Haven educator has concluded
of the era:
New Haven was indeed a model city for the
nation if it is defined in terms of new buildings,
new stores, and the physical apparatus of a city.
V/hen the definition is extended to include such
factors as goals of education, changing neighbor-
hoods, and the central issue of power, a different
picture emerges. Had the educational structure
been more effective in relating to the changing
population of its neighborhood schools, had the
channels been left open for the black and minority
populations to change those institutions that di-
rectly impinged upon their lives, then the bone of
povrer vfould have been far less crucial.
The first formal participatory body in the education sys-
tem is the city's Board of Education. It consists of the
mayor and seven members appointed by the mayor who serve four
year terms without pay. The Board has general control over
the entire school system and is required by state law to ap-
point a superintendent of schools who serves as the executive
officer of the Board, and who is responsible for implementing
the policies determined by the Board. The day-to-day opera-
tion of the system is the responsibility of the superintendent
and his staff.
^^Cleo Abraham, Urban City (New York: Carlton Press,
Inc., 1972), p. 29.
Appointments to the Board of Education are basically
political. Realistically, true resident participation
through the Board as a vehicle can be achieved only super-
ficially through the Board’s open meetings. Board members
traditionally have reflected the views, and the will, of the
mayor who appointed them. Because of the four year term, it
is not so easy for an incumbent whose vievrs differ radically
from his predecessor’s to alter quickly the Board’s composi-
tion. liayor lee sought to effect a change in the relatively
conservative Board he inherited as quickly as possible. One
of his initial accomplishments was to appoint the first black
member in the history of the Board. Not until the late 1950's
and early 1960’s was Lee able to stock the Board with a ma-
jority of progressives lilce Mitchell Sviridoff.
It is not unlikely for Board members appointed by a pre-
vious administration to clash with a new administration. One
recent example occurred in the spring of 1971 when tvro memr-
bers, one the president, resigned because of the curtailment
of Board funds and other political complications. A third
member also appointed by the previous mayor resigned shortly
thereafter. Events as these tend to stigmatize City Hall in-
^"^Dahl discusses the political nature of the Board and
its ” executive— centered” decision-making in the Lee ^d pre-
vious administrations. The mayor and his Board appointees
decide or influence most decisions more than the superin-
tendent except in the areas of curriculum and internal organ-
ization. Of course, this varies depending on the superm-
tendent’s leadership. VHio G-ovems ? (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity, 1961), pp. 205-20^
.
”'®Abraham, Urban City> p. 89.
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volvement in education in purely negative terms. The Board’s
integrity suffers and its role as a participatory vehicle ex-
ists solely as a political device which permits direct resi-
dent petitioning.
V/ith the establishment of CPI, its educational programs
within the school system, and its neighborhood offices, resi-
dents began to participate in running programs and responding
to community organization initiatives. Three hundred neigh-
borhood residents, most from the inner city, journeyed to
Hartford by bus to urge the 1965 General Assembly to pass a
bill "to improve and accelerate education of children whose
educational achievement has been or is being restricted by
economic, social, or environmental disadvantages." ^ The
group met with the governor and was heard at the hearings.
The State Aid to Disadvantaged Children Act passed two months
later.
Other examples abound. "In the Scranton School area, a
reactivated PTA organization with an ADC (Aid to Dependent
Children) welfare mother as its new leader waged a successful
campaign for classroom and playground improvements. Else-
where a school principal in a low income neighborhood failed
to convince parents that he was anything but apathetic and
uncaring. The parents demanded that the Board of Education
^^State of Connecticut, "An Act Concerning State Aid
for Disadvantaged Children," Bill No. 242, Sec. (1),
Connecticut General Assembly, Special January Session, 1965.
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remove him
. . . and the Board did."^^ VHien the first director
of New Haven’s Headstart Program retired, parents of children
in the program helped to select a successor.
Consistently, progress in resident participation increased
in various ways. The concept of the community school planning
team, drawing together the assistant principal, area group
work and recreation supervisors, the CPI neighborhood coordin-
ator, and other neighborhood service people, also proved ef-
fective. Activities at Prince Street school, a community
school serving New Haven's Hill area, provided a notable ex-
ample of effective team work with residents. In the spring
of 1968 the Prince Community School team played a key role in
establishing discussions between neighborhood residents, in-
cluding militsjits, and established agencies such as the
Chamber of Commerce. As a result, SI 07,000 in funds con-
tributed by the Chamber and its various members supplemented
summer program funds available through CPI.
The Community School teams developed and implemented pro-
grams with the aid of a Citizen’s Advisory Committee, a be-
lated vehicle designed some five years after the Community
School Program commenced. Each committee, one per community
school, consisted of twenty-one to thirty-five parents and
neighborhood residents who met separately from the community
school team to discuss programs, new ideas, and suggestions
vrhich could be made to the team. In addition, three members
of each committee were representatives to the city-wide
^^Allan Talbot, The Mayor's game: Richard Lee of New
Haven and the Politic's of ckange , York: Harper and
Row, 1 967 )
t
P« 211.
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Citizen’s Advisory Cominittee which served a similar feedback
function for the superintendent’s office.
By 1968, however, the Board of Education was convinced
that a more formalized vehicle for direct resident participa-
tion in educational decision-making v:as necessary. Perhaps,
like CPI, such a vehicle represented an inevitable extension
of the system’s historical role. More likely causal factors
existed in the almost daily occurrence of incidents with ra-
cial overtones in the schools. During the 1967-68 school
year, these incidents disrupted many school days with injured
and arrested students, police assigned to the schools, and ra-
cial tension high. Adding to the system’s problems, the Board
of Education released in llay, 1968, the results of a reading
survey of New Haven students which showed 43 percent of the
students in the city reading one to two years below grade
level and 4 percent three years below grade level. School
vandalism at the same time was increasing monthly.
In an effort to arrive at a response that would serve a
preemptive function as well as a crisis—oriented one, the
Board formed a committee to study new ways of citizen parti-
cipation in the school system. The committee worked from sum-
mer 1968 to summer 1969 and finally recommended the establish-
ment of councils composed of representatives of all the con-
stituencies in the educational process (students, parents,
teachers, administrators, and staff). Among many suggestions,
they proposed that each school have a council which would
es-
tablish discipline codes, develop curricula, and screen
new
school personnel.
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No sooner had the committee submitted its report than
the City Plan Commission initiated a similar study under a
state program named Community Development Action Plan (CDAP)
.
The department subcontracted the education study to the Edu-
cation Improvement Center, a non-profit organization "to de-
velop, coordinate, and supervise programs undertaken by the
six colleges in the New Haven area to assist the New Haven
Public School system. CDAP was a product of the 1967 Con-
necticut General Assembly which established the Department of
Community Affairs. The legislature specified that any city
wishing to receive DCA funds must undertake and complete a
community development action plan within a three year period.
Resident participation was essential to every phase of the
planning process.
The Educational Improvement Center conducted the educa-
tion component of the comprehensive CDAP study with its
S40,000 contract with the city. The Center subcontracted
with an independent citizens action group. Citizens Commission
to Develop Quality Education. The Commission's function v/as
to facilitate citizen participation throughout the education
study. Task forces established by the Center and the Com-
mission investigated school economics, governance, manage-
ment, pre— service and in-service education, pupil personnel
services, reading and vocational education, school health,
and library media centers. It was, however, the report by
^^Nev7 Haven Education Improvement Center and Citizens'
Commission to Develop Quality Education, "Proposal to the
New Haven City Plan Commission," n.d., p. 1.
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"the governance task force which further developed the concept
of resident participation in the schools.
The ultimate challenge of developing and implementing a
participatory vehicle fell to George Harris, a former princi-
pal and trouble-shooter at Prince Community School. After re-
ceiving several crisis assignments from the superintendent,
Harris took a sabbatical in 1969 to study the formation of
School-Community Councils as part of his doctoral study at
Michigan State University. The following year, while com-
pleting his dissertation on the School-Community Council con-
cept (see Appendix for details), he served as a cons'ultant to
the Nevj Haven school system, laying the foundations to imple-
ment it. Upon receiving his degree in J-une, 1970, Dr. Harris
returned to New Haven to assume the position of Assistant
Superintendent for Supportive Services. By June, 1972,
thirty-seven councils had been established to advise their
schools on budgetary, curricul-um, and personnel matters,
while eight schools elected to maintain their present system
of governance.
The CDAP study on education also made two other major
recommendations for increased citizen participation. It
^^The entire study, consisting of ninety-two recommenda-
tions and hundreds of pages, ranks with the Butterworth (1947)
and the three 1962 studies (see Chapter I) as another at-
tempt by New Haven to determine its present education status
and future goals. The main, and very significant, difference
between this and the previous studies is that those who have
the greatest stake in the school system, the users, profes-
sional and non-professional alike, had a hand in making judg-
ments as well as recommendations for school improvement.
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for "th.© crGcifion of an Office of Conini'uni'ty Involvemen't
to support the School-Community Councils by facilitating city-
wide council communications, reviewing disciplinary actions
by the councils, and dealing with citizen suggestions and
grievances.
The other recommendation dealt with the Board of Educa-
tion’s membership. The report recommended that a city Charter
Revision Commission change the manner of selecting Board of
Education members "to accomplish broader and more responsive
24
representation." One proposal suggested increasing the
Board of Education from seven to thirteen members — three
appointed by the Mayor at his discretion, three appointed by
the Mayor from nominees submitted by the Board of Alderman,
and seven appointed by the Mayor from nominees submitted by
School-Community Councils. To date, no progress has been
made on this recommendation.
Though participation, true resident participation in edu-
cational decision-making, remains as elusive a goal as ever,
it also remains a viable community objective and a recognized
institutional necessity. Lapses in community initiative as
^
^Education Improvement Center and the Citizens Comr-
mission to Develop Quality Education, "Education," Section
I, V/orking Paper 6, July, 1970, chap. P» 88*
^%ew Haven City Plan Commission, Community Development
Action Plan for the Cit?/ of New Haven , Draft for Review by
the Board of Alderman, February 9, 197 1 , F- 11 .
^^Ibid.
106
well as rekindled institutional conservatism mitigate against
achieving the most efficient practical solution. Perhaps^
vfhat was, again, a major unforeseen, unanticipated achieve-
ment of the reform coalition was gained through the process
of striving : new community-minded leadership was horn in the
neighborhoods and schools of hew Haven.
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CHAPTER V
A COALITION REFORM STRATEGY
IN URBAN EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS
Sarason has written that "an initial req'uirenient of a
theory of change is that it can he appropriate to, and mirror
the complexities of, social settings."^ An attempt has been
made in preceeding chapters to indicate the complexity of a
coalition reform strategy in New Haven. Particular emphasis
on context and chronology assisted in the construction of
settings from the coalition’s outset to its termination. In
this, the concluding chapter, an effort will he made to ex-
trapolate from the Nev7 Haven experience general elements of
this strategy which may he useful elsewhere in urban education.
Some Additional Reform Perspectives
On the s'urface, educational reform thro'ugh community ac-
tion attempted dual, concurrent objectives during the last
decade: it sought to meet continuing educational needs V7hile
at the same time redefining and changing the institutions
charged with that responsibility. VJhatever the chosen strategy,
reformers were quick to adhere to two f'undamental ass'umptions
or propositions in planning their efforts. First, they recog-
nized that education is completely interdependent with other
components of society's framework. Secondly, they accepted
the fact that school systems are not competent in all the
^Seymour B. Sarason, The Culture of the School and the
Problem of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971),
p. 58.
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specific areas which contribute to the educative process.^
Basic, then, to recent educational reform is a strategy which
seeks to highlight this interdependence by redefining or im-
plementing new roles and relationships between urban educa-
tional resources and institutions.
Three such model strategies, of which New Haven is one,
emerged in the 1960‘s. Figure 5t1 shov;s a simple schematic
of these community action model strategies. V/hile the con-
cern of this study remains New Haven, a brief digression is
worthwhile in order to add perspective to the New Haven an-
alysis.
FIGURE 5:1
THREE COffilUNITY ACTION REFORI^ STRATEGIES
Competitive .ACoalitional Complementary
The competitive strategy consisted of an attempt to
demonstrate exemplary educational programs and practices
through non-traditional structures and means. Once credibly
and successfully demonstrated, these programs and practices
could be absorbed or simulated by a school system at the
iiTgi rg of the community. Consec^^uently, accountability is
community—directed by using neighborhood resident pressure
^These assumptions are similarly elucidated H* Ra-lpii
Taylor's "The Educational Dimensions of the Model Cities Pro-
-am" in Education and Urban Renaissance , ed. by Ronald F.
Campbell, et ^., (New York^ John Uiley & Sons, Inc.),
p. 17-18.
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to force a lethargic, inert school system to accept and imple-
ment change. This strategy was aimed at very large school
systems which by their sheer size are unmanageable by a cen-
tral authority and unyielding to internal change factors. The
New York City school system is a prime example.
In 1966 Mayor John Lindsay sought to remedy the squander-
ing of the city’s resources by investigating new bureaucratic
arrangements for resource coordination.^ This was, in part,
necessary groundwork for New York City's participation in the
Federal Demonstration Cities Program (Model Cities).^ New
York was at that time spending S90 million in anti-poverty
funds and an additional SI .4 billion on human resource deve-
lopment in poverty-stricken areas. These efforts were too
inadequate and uncoordinated to succeed. The mayor's office
in conjunction vjith the Institute of Public Administration
tapped Mitchell Sviridoff, New Haven's anti-poverty agency
executive director, to conduct the study.
The study recommended the establishment of a Human Re-
sources Administration (HRA) for the city. It would be
^In his first tenn, Lindsay advocated the decentraliza-
tion of city government and to some degree established "little
city halls" throughout New York City.
^A new federal, anti-poverty approach replete with man-
dated resident participation requirements with ^ ultimate con-
trol resting with municipal government. Enabling legislation
v^as the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act
of 1966.
^Institute of Public Administration, Developing New York
C itv ' s Human Resources: Report of the Institute of Publ_ig
Aflmi-nistration to Mayor John V. Lindsay , Mitchell Sviridof ,
study director. Volume I, June, 1966, p. 8.
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structured to maximize resource coordination and performance
in community development, manpower and career development, so-
cial services and public assistance, and education. Because
the Board of Education is a separate agency independent of the
city’s administration, the study recommended the establishment
of the Office of Education Liaison (OEL) within the HRA to
provide a critical daily linkage between the two agencies.
The need for institutional reform was clear to both
Mayor Lindsay and the planners involved in the study. Couched
in cautious, politically acceptable terminology, the intent of
the HRA was, in fact, to reform Hew York’s social service
agencies and specifically their bureaucracies. This, of
course, included education, perhaps the most inaccessible in-
stitution due to its long time independent status.
The thrust in education involved the installation of the
Programr-Planning-Budget System (PPBS). This budgetary process
promised to "relate money to educational objectives rather
than merely to administrative divisions." In fact it repre-
sented a new means of ascertaining performance and assuring
accountability. Furthermore, the system would enable the HRA
to implement Lindsay’s key strategy of using anti-poverty pro-
grams to demonstrate to the massive education establishment
successful new ways of educating children. Once this was ac-
complished, the school system would have to reform or bear the
consequences of public acrimony mustered through community ac-
^Institute of Public Administration, Developing Hew York
City’s Resources , p. 54.
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tion efforts."^
Thus, the crux of the Lindsay paradigm was a tv^o-fold,
competitive model: one, anti-poverty programs would openly
compete with the school system to demonstrate successful edu-
cational programs and practices, and tv;o, community action ef-
forts would focus on organizing local support for the adoption
of these successes on a system-wide scale. The school system
would gradually accede to institutional reform when faced with
credible educational alternatives supported by the community.
Unfortunately, no sooner had this begun when the tempest
of decentralization struck the city. In the fall of 1966,
community leaders demanded control of I.S. 201, whose facto
segregated student body was composed entirely of Blacks and
Puerto Ricans. The resulting turmoil shifted Lindsay's pri-
mary reform strategy to a concentration on decentralization
as a process for community development and a mechanism for
fundamental changes in structure and procedure in the school
system.®
The second refom model approach, the complementary
^Davis S. Seeley, "A Big City Mayor Tries His Hand at
School Reform," TovJ'ard Improved Urban Education , ed. by
Frank U. Lutz (Belmont, California; Wadsworth Publishing
Co., 1970), p. 186.
^Indications were that the competitive model was not
best suited for the nation's largest school system. The ex-
tensive, though fragmented anti-poverty programs, many oi
which were established prior to the HRA, failed to perform
as expected, demonstrating few exemplary programs. The
task
of organizing local support also proved too lengthy and
mor
difficult than anticipated, VJhatever the cause , the strat-
egy was irrevocably shifted by the decentralization
issue.
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strategy, relies on the reformist instinct from within a
school system using additional resources and expertise when
appropriate to plan and implement institutional change.
Under this model, educators played a dominant revisionist role
as change initiators, program planners, and implementers with-
in the context of community action. A good example of this
model is Corpus Christi, Texas.
Kno^m originally as the Community Committee on Youth,
Education and Joh Opportunities, Inc. (CCYEJO).^ Corpus
Christi' s Community action agency was initiated in part hy
professional educators in the school system vrho acted in the
belief that the opportunity and means to retool extensively
the educational offerings and responses to community needs
could be provided a community action program. Working with
local welfare and social service agencies, these educators
were successful in establishing the city's community action
agency as a separate private, non-profit organization whose
funded program structure consisted mainly of educational pro-
grams proposed through the school system. The school system
thus became by far the largest single delegate agency of the
anti-poverty agency. The latter served primarily as a fund-
ing conduit and community participation vehicle. The super-
intendent of schools was also a major decision-maker on the
%ow knovTn as the Nueces County Community Action Agency.
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CCYEJO Board of Directors,
As antithetical as it appears, the implied basis of the
complementary strategy is that those best qualified to direct
institutional refo2?m are those who have the greatest positions
of authority and responsibility in the institution. Institu-
tions outside of education are peripheral reform participants
which mostly as a contributing infrastructure of expertise and
resources to complement the efforts of the educational super-
structure, Inevitably some redefinition of traditional roles
and relationships occurs.
The coalitional model sought to reform public-serving in-
stitutions through a partnership of cooperative planning, de-
cision-making, and resource sharing. Problem-solving through
social adaptation resulted from a pooling of professional and
non-professional talents and additional resources to create
alternatives to dysfunctional social system components. In
education, this constituted a commitment to find alternatives
to traditional educational programs and practices, with the
active involvement of non-educators as outside agents of
change
.
This study has examined a leading example of a coalition
reform model — Nev7 Haven, How by way of summary and analy-
sis a review of this model and its most salient features as
applied in New Haven follows.
^
^Nicholas A. Masters, "Some Political Problems Involved
in Educational Planning," in Designing Education for the
ture No. 3 Planning and Effecting Needed Changes in Education,
ed. by Edgar“LT Ilorphe-b and Charles 0. Ryan U'^ew York:
Citation Press, 1967)» PP» 147-148.
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Coalition Reform in New Haven
J The coalition reform movement between New Haven's comr-
mimity action agency and the school system piirsued a process-
oriented change strategy
, Starting with a comprehensive as-
sessment of hirnnan conditions in the city, the coalition sought
the social means, e.g. programs, organizations, and new rela-
tionships, to attain specific, albeit ideal, social ends, i.e.
elimination of poverty, equality of educational opportunity.
Most importantly, the coalition shunned a rigid monolithic ap-
proach for a flexible and developmental posture guided by the
critical forces of social processes
.
This basic attitude vras
manifest largely in the coalition's willingness to adapt in-
stitutional structures and responses to rapidly changing pub-
lic needs and demands, while at the same time maintaining a
continuity of intent and concerted resources. Unfortunately
because the net products of social processes are -unlikely to
be pre-planned objectives, they are seldom appreciated as suc-
cess factors in eval-uations.
There are three identifiable institutional change pro-
cesses which characterized reform through New Haven's com-
munity action agency — school system coalition: 1) a shift-
ing of leadership roles, 2) the decentralization of organiza-
tional struct-ures, and 5) pl-uralization of decision-maxing
procedures
.
11 VJithin the context of change, these processes
Evidence of these same processes clearly exists "to
varying degrees in the other reform strategy examples treated
earlier (New York, Corpus Christi) . This is a matter for
f-urther study or perhaps another dissertation.
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themselves represent a notable achievement in the institutions
affected by them.
Figure 5:2 graphically illustrates the institutional
change processes over the ten year span of the coalition's
existence. Simplified, the processes substantively involved
the leadership, organizational and procedural variables of
CPI and the New Haven school system.
PIOUEE 5:2
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE PROCESS OF COI#TUNITY
PROGRESS, INC. AND THE NEW HAVEN SCHOOL SYSTEM
Variables 1 962 1 972
Leadership
Organizational
Procedural
Executive > Community
Centralization > Decentralization
Non-part icipation > Part icipat ion
Hindsight allows the temporal use of before and after elements.
In 1962 these represented a statement of static negative con-
ditions; in 1972 the same variables are in a dynamic develop-
mental state undergoing further redefinition and transition as
public requirements change. Further clarification of the vari-
ables' change due to the process is mandatory in order to avoid
any assixmption that the Figure 5:2 variables represent abso-
lutes: they do not.
In 1962 educational and social service leadership, in New
Haven was extremely formalized institutionally, and exclu-
sively executive-oriented. The operating style of the school
system and public agencies centered around administrative fig-
ures much as city hall centered around the mayor. Signifi-
cantly, when the CPI-Board of Education coalition was formed.
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^Is pattern continued with considerable variation in calibre
and sense of mission. Both CPI's executive director and the
school superintendent were newly chosen for their jobs; both
had progressive backgrounds in their respective fields —
labor and education; the executive director had recently been
president of the city's Board of Education. Their task was
to mobilize resources and attitudes to make a tvjo-pronged at-
tack on poverty through education and employment. Conse-
quently institutional leadership of the coalition v^as highly
executive-oriented at least through the peak phase (1966) of
its existence, by which time the original executives had
moved on. New sources of leadership gained credibility and
responsibility through the recruitment and promotion of mi-
nority educators in the school system, through genuinely
sensitive and outspoken neighborhood advocates, and through
numerous third party groups and individuals who worked tire-
lessly on critical issues and projects in the schools and CPI.
For example, neighborhood-elected residents now direct neigh-
borhood corporations which are charged with the responsibility,
for anti-poverty program on the neighborhood level. In recent
years minority and other school personnel originally classroom
teachers have gained administrative positions with leadership
functions. Non-educators received appointments as community
school coordinators with vice—principal status. Community
school teams have neighborhood residents on them (originally
they did not) and School-Community Councils have parents,
teachers, and other school staff who directly exert leader-
ship influences in the governing of the schools.
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In 1962 the organizational structures of the school sys-
tem and Nev/ Haven's public service agencies were extremely
centralized. Seats of authority very much approximated the
common organizational pyramid and most were located in New
Haven's central business district, "downtown" as far as the
public was concerned. The first steps to revise this opera-
tional structure was the adoption of the Community School Pro-
gram and the installation of CPI neighborhood service centers
at the community schools. Organizationally this meant an ex-
panded administrative staff — school vice-principals and CPI
social service staff — at the neighborhood level. Programs
which v/ere cooperatively developed and administered by CPI
and school personnel took a quantum leap in numbers compared
with previous programming . And the nature of the decentral-
ized and CPI programming concommitantly required other agen-
cies to adopt a neighborhood service structure in order to be
able to participate in the new federally and privately funded
programs, e.g. the city's Park Department assigned area super-
visors to community school teams; likewise summer day camps
were reorganized to serve specific neighborhoods.
As the decentralization process matured under the stress
of various local crises and national influences, the signifi-
cance of CPI's decentralization outstripped that of the school
system. CPI's entire organizational structure except for cer-
tain manpower programs was reconstituted in the form of neigh-
borhood corporations. Today a residual technical assistance
staff remains at the CPI central office to facilitate funding
procedures and serve the CPI Board of Directors; the net
in-
ft
118
stitutional change was so complete that many CPI non-resident
employees literally worked themselves out of their jobs.
The third reform process was the pluralization of deci-
sion-making procedures. This stands perhaps as a result of
the two aforementioned processes but the fact remains that
even with a shift of leadership and decentralized organiza-
tional structures, locically the procedures for making deci-
sions, big or small, did not have to change. The powers that
traditionally had made decisions, the ancien regime
, still
had the wherewithal to maintain those procedures ^ facto
within the nev; operational context. Fortunately, they chose
to recognize the obvious need for this to change. The conse-
quences, the means and ends of the pluralization process, are
discussed in Chapter IV.
The significa,nce of this process in Nevj Haven is that it
completed the essential linkage for neighborhood government,
a direct decision-making and accountability system of quasi-
governance on the neighborhood level. Born in the rhetoric
of commimity control and the demands of the city's civil dis-
turbances, neighborhood government became first an end itself
and then a means by V7hich neighborhoods could exercise local
i
decision-making authority. The previously discussed processes
served well in preparing local professional and non-profes-
sional leadership and in creating organizational structures
for the functional tasks of neighborhood rule, but as Kotler
observes, "institutional authority goes with territorial con-
trol, and one power cannot hold the institution if another
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power holds the territory."^ ^ legitlmatizatlon of neigh-
borhood decision-making sources provided the institutional
authority needed by the neighborhoods who had already achieved
territorial control.
To relate this more directly, the concept of neighborhood
government began with the realization by neighborhood resi-
dents, primarily the poor, that New Haven's political, eco-
nomic, and education systems were not doing enough for them.
And the social service system was not able to fill the void
in spite of CPI's valiant efforts. City hall, the school sys-
tem, CPI, and others attempted to placate neighborhood discon-
tent through gradual accommodation. The use of participatory
vehicles represents a major example of this. Eventually, how-
ever, neighborhood advocates gained institutional commitments
to their leadership, i.e., positions in CPI and the school
system; they accumulated sufficient political experience to
plan and direct their own organizations and due to increasing
national and local pressures, e.g. community control movement,
school racial incidents, they found a fundamental acceptance
of their organizational initiatives. Institutional decision-
making procedures were redesigned. The school system reacted
most notably with School-Community Councils, a radical de-
parture from traditional educational decision-making. CPI
provided the commitment and technical advice for the estab-
lishment of neighborhood corporations, a new political and
^
^Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Qovernment: The Local
Foundations of Political Life (New York; Bobbs-I-Ierrill
Co., lyby) , p.
~
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j
.
social service institution. Bolstered by these institutional
achievements, neighborhood government, though far from being
absolute or even self-sufficient, must now share part of the
institutional responsibility for social problem-solving and
change
.
Political Rhymes and Reasons
Any reform movement is political by definition. Improv-
ing or amending something for whatever reason means a redefin-
ition of present roles and relationships, a change in an ex-
isting power structure. Coalitional reform simply involves
partners in this effort. It then follows that as perpetrators
of reform, coalition partners must themselves be political.
The logic can be pushed further, but it need not be to make
the point: the New Haven coalition — the community action
agency and the school system — vras basically a political
partnership in a political movement. CPI was conceived as a
political device and even carried a stigma over most its his-
tory as an extension of city hall. The school system, like
all school systems according to Agger and Goldstein, "in addi-
tion to having educational (and economic) purposes and effects
is a political system in itself in a congeries of political
systems." Political maneuvers and decisions were a daily
task of both institutions.
It is not the intention here to resurrect and analyze
^
^Robert E. Agger and Marshall N. Goldstein, ^o Will
Ru~l e the Schools: A Cultinral Class Crisis ( Belmonx^ Csdn—
fomia: V/adsv/orth Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 3.
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every political decision over the ten year period. This
analysis is concerned with the major political decisions and
their implications which implemented and sustained the coali-
tion's efforts.
The first, and perhaps most important, political decision
made by the coalition was to establish CPI, the coalition
change agent, as a separate, private and non-profit agency.
This move, prompted by obvious political reasons discussed
earlier, enabled CPI to be an advocate, to tread where others
feared to, to do practically anything necessary to dislodge
the school and social service systems from their default posi-
tions. Unencumbered by established relationships, political
debts, and the like, CPI was free to devise its own operating
style and supportive strategies. Of these, two represent the
principle guiding light for most others.
CPI's social executives recognized at the outset that
success would have to be demonstrated clearly as well as
early. Two sub-strategies emerged to support this realization.
First, the procedural stages of organizational development and
-i-nstitutional change should reflect the modes and associations
demonstrated as successful by the city during urban renewal.
Secondly, the agency and its reform movement should be touted
as the first demonstration of human renewal in the country.
The first sub-strategy amounted to a system of political
parity (Table 5:1). CPI duplicated in its externals the
formal political structure in New Haven. The school system
through the community school structure created an internal
parity within its formal organization.
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TABLE 5:1
POLITICAL PARITY AND COALITION REFORM
Model
City
Redevelopment
Agency
Mayor
Board of
Alderman
External
Community Action Agency
CPI
Executive Director
Board of Directors
Internal
School System
Community School
Program
Superintendent
Board of Education
Citizens Action
Committee
Residents Advisory
Committee
Community School
Advisory Board
Ward System Neighborhood Cor-
porations
School Community
Councils
Taking over a weak-mayor- council form of government and
turning it into a strong-mayor-council, ^ Mayor Richard Lee
accomplished his controversial objectives (redevelopment) by
administrative fiat; similarly, CPI's executive director and
the superintendent exercised considerable personal determina-
tion and administrative leverage without explicit mandates to
achieve their institutional objectives. Establishing CPI and
the community school program as separate entities was, in fact,
a replication of the mayor's political move in setting the Re-
development Agency aside from the city's government and its
constitutional constraints. Furthermore in his city record
of eight, two-year terms, the mayor enjoyed a significant
^
^Charles R. Adrian, governing Our Fifty States and
Their Communities (New Yor^l McCraw-Hill Book Company,
lybv;, pp yb-ya.
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aldermanic majority of party members who supported its pro-
grams, likewise, the CPI and school boards were carefully
stocked with progressives who were comfortable playing pas-
sive, supportive roles for the activist reform executives.
The mayor also recognized early in his redevelopment efforts
the need to legitimate many executive decisions and involve
community sub-leaders in major city projects. For redevelop-
ment he created the Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) and for
education, the Citizens Advisory Committee on Education.
CPI and the school’s leadership sought these same ends of ad-
ministrative, policy, and program sanctions from the Resi-
dents Advisory Committee and the city-wide Community School
Advisory Board, bodies similar in function and intent to the
mayor's committees. Lastly, New Haven's political infrastruc-
ture is based on the ward system, an old and cherished device
for party support and management. CPI and the school system
have facilitated community support through neighborhood cor-
porations and school-community councils respectively.
In sum the CPI-Board of Education coalition wisely cre-
ated a parity of successful mechanisms which mirrored the
local political strategy for change. And typically partici-
patory vehicles were most useful for this purpose.
The second sub-strategy — staking a national reputa-
^
^Robert A. Dahl, V/ho Governs? Democracy and ^
an American City (New Haven”: Yale University Press, )
,
p. 1^9. The 'education body was eventually absorbed by the
CAC as a special subcommittee.
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tion — was less complex. National publicity and federal
recognition established an irrefutable veneer, however super-
ficial, of success. CPI was a showcase anti—poverty agency
just as Conte School, the first new school built as a New
Haven coromimity school, was a showcase educational innovation.
A direct benefit of this model sub—strategy was a req^uest
in 1965 by the Office of Economic Opportunity that CPI develop
a training center which would prepare community action person-
nel for the New England region. CPI responded with the Com-
munity Action Institute, an educational delegate agency which
conducted on-the-job training, held seminars, and produced
training films for nearly five years. Before its function
became obsolete, CAI had encountered several hundred profes-
sional and non-professional trainees and schooled them at
CPI.^^
Community Action Vehicles: Reexamined and Defined
Community action vehicles were discussed in detail in
Chapter IV. Additional references concerning their politi-
cal use have already been made elsewhere in this chapter. It
remains for these vehicles to be scrutinized aside from poli-
tical motives and raisons d*§tre .
The participatory instruments which operationalize the
Clark and Hopkins definition of community action programs
(see Chapter IV, p.86 ) fall into three basic categories:
systemic, sub-systemic, and extra-systemic apparatuses. To
^
^Community Progress, Inc., The Human Story (New Haven
CPI, 1966), pp. 92-93.
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be sure, some of the vehicles described in Chapter IV fit more
snugly than others in the follov^ing conceptualization; how-
ever, the categories do serve well in providing perspective
and analytical foci.
A systemic participatory apparatus is an organizational
vehicle for broad representative governing through policy
formation. It is characteristically a constituted body with
a membership appointed or elected by a pre-determined process.
Members participate as representatives of ascribed constitu-
encies primarily by exercising a voting privilege which re-
sults in the support of opposition of policy. In some cases
members will actively participate in the development of those
policies though usually this is done by non-member assistance,
e.g. executive director, agent of the body, superintendent,
CPI’s Board of Directors, the Board of Education, the Resident
Advisory Committee, and the School-Community Councils fall
within this functional category.
The second category — sub-systemic participatory ve-
hicles — is an organizational vehicle for specific opera-
tional inputs through daily representative decision-making.
Such bodies are organized around elected, appointed, and vol-
imteer participants who serve to facilitate the fomation and
implementation of specific programs, A sub—systemic appara-
tus is organizationally accountable to the systemic appa-
ratus. Coalition examples relate mainly to the program de-
livery systems, such as the CPI neighborhood service office,
the community school teams, and more recently the neighbor-
hood corporations.
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The final category, the extra-systemic participatory
apparatus, describes non-system vehicles for formal and in-
formal inputs through organized service, pressure and influ-
ence. These are typically organizations generated by a
specific need or for a limited purpose and which continue to
function in a participatory role. At times they serve as in-
dependent third party voices in decision-making, as legiti-
mating support for systemic apparatus decisions, as coopera-
participants in both systemic and sub—systemic apparatus
ventures, and more often as a forum for mass discussion of,
and confrontation over, educational issues. This study has
dealt with two examples in this category the Educational Im-
provement Center (EIC) and the Citizens Commission to Develop
Quality Education (CCDQE)')
.
Others include the Black Coali-
tion, and the Black Educators, tv;o organized groups generated
during the pealc coalition phase as issue-oriented activists
for ITev; Haven’s minority blacks.
Goals. Scale and the Sum of Educational Enterprises
Chapter III discussed in detail the educational enter-
prises of the reform coalition. Though very much the day-
to-day business of the coalition, the real intent of these
programs was to change the traditional practices of a very
traditional, urban school system. Emphasis on early educa-
tion, environment and peer influence, cultural enrichment,
and teacher development attempted to highlight long neglected,
likely root causes of poor student outcomes and general fail-
ure for innei^city, poor and minority students. To the ex-
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tent that new practices (teacher and student development
efforts) and innovative flexibility have been institutional-
ized, these enterprises have been successful. V/hether or not
this would have eventually occurred without the intervention
of a change agent (CPI), no one can know. Most coalition pro-
gram evaluations, conducted in-house for funding purposes,
merely fed the biases of proponents and critics and the con-
troversy that forever accompanies evaluative claims.
Mounting evidence indicates that the initial role ex-
pected of educational innovations — programs and practices
did not materialize.
An extensive survey of research by the Rand Corporation
could not find "a variant of the existing educational system
that is consistently related to students* educational out-
1
7
comes.” Rand concluded that there was "a suggestion (from
existing research) that substantial improvement in educa-
tional outcomes can be obtained only through a vastly differ-
1 Pi
ent fonm of education." Implying that educational innova-
tions in recent years were too small in scale and perhaps too
large in their expectations Rand recommended that large-scale
1
7
Harvey A. Averch, et ^., How Effective is Schooling?
A Critical Review and S7)mThesis of Research Findings (Santa
Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1972), p. 1 54*
A finding complemented by other recent research that
"there is not yet a substantial body of evidence to sub-
stantiate a definitive set of desirable teaching behaviors in
any one given situation." Norma Purst and Russell A. Hill,
"Systematic Classroom Observation," Rncyclopedia of Education ,
Volume 2 (New York: I-IacMillian, 1971) / p. 181.
^
^Ibid
.. p. 162.
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experiments or demonstrations of different forms of calcula-
tion should be implemented, carefully observed, and evalu-
1 9ated. It did not, however, elaborate cn what the "forms"
might be.
In the decade 1960 to 1970, the Ford Foundation, com-
pletely separate from its funding of educational enterprises
through its G-reat Cities-Gray Areas Program (community ac-
tion)
,
conducted the Comprehensive School Improvement Program,
a S30 million, twenty-five project venture aimed at legiti-
mizing the concept of innovation in public school programs
and at testing various kinds of innovation. Project innova-
tions included 1) new patterns of staff utilization, 2) de-
velopment and use of new curriculum materials, 3) use of tech-
nology, 4) experiments in grouping of students and utiliza-
tion of time, and 5) innovative arrangement and use of school
20
space. Such concepts as team teaching, flexible scheduling,
programmed instruction, use of paraprofessionals, and indivi-
dualized study programs dominated the attempted innovations.
In a Ford-initiated independent evaluation, these programs in
21general received a flunking grade.
The Ford Report, like its Rand predecessor, indicts the
major innovations of the recently- concluded decade. Un-
^
^Ibid
.
,
p. 163.
^^Ford Foundation, A Foundation Goes to School: The
Ford Foundation Comprehensive School Improvement Program
1960-1970 ( liew York ; Ford Foundation, i9'/2) , p. 18.
^"'pred M. Hechinger, "Program that Flunked," New York
Tines, Sunday, December 10, 1972, sec. 4, p. 5.
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fortunately neither provides a detailed analysis of individual
projects; instead they present general attitudes and condi-
tions, e.g. conservatism, goal clarification, vrhich reflect
on the collective use of techniques and programs to attain
sweeping changes, New Haven’s educational enterprises suffer
the same inscrutable perception.
Though it is not a purpose of this study, evaluating the
coalition's cooperative programs on any reasonable terms is
still likely to produce differing critical opinions. The
point which rarely arises in such evaluations is that their
real importance may lie in a vital contributory role in the
larger social processes, an end in itself and one which is
hardly quantifiable as an outcome, A major contention of
this study is that the process of changing settings and
changing reform requirements produced long term reform by-
products — community sub-leadership, decentralized organi-
zations, pluralized decision-making — more important than
the limited objectives of segmental enterprise innovation.
Aside from purely speculative aspects, the nature of the
coalition’s enterprises have a technical side which, when ex-
amined, adds to the organizational concept and theory of edu-
cational reform.
Organizationally the coalition’s enterprises were com-
pensatory by intent, experimental or supplemental by design.
The compensatory label is one which most remedial efforts of
the period must accept. As institutional responses to in-
adequate existing efforts, programs generally sought to close
the achievement gap between students and in most cases, this
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meant raising the achievement of poor and minority inner-city
students to match their white, middle-class counterparts. To
do this, resources made available through CPI and its rela-
tionship with the school system flawed into enterprises of a
new experimental nature or a supportive supplemental nature.
The former usually constituted the introduction of innovative
curricula, approaches, or practices under non-permanent status
and trial-and-error conditions. The Headstart concept, cul-
tural enrichment programs, and work—study arrangements are
examples of this. The latter represented a continuing comr-
mitment to existing practices, such as reducing teacher-stu-
dent ratios and extra reading instinctors, using the addi-
tional resources to further develop, implement, or expand the
concept or practice.
Another technical aspect v:as the experience of extensive
and intensive growth among enterprises. Extensive gro-irfch
simply refers to an expansion of present services to involve
a larger target or participant population. An increased
grant appropriation or budget accommodation was normally nec-
essary to extend enterprise services to more people. Inten-
sive groirth describes the internal enterprise development, an
increase in program sophistication — including integration -•
also requiring more capital, investment. As grants expired
or vrere renewed, enterprises changed; some terminated while
others included more participants and/or revised their prem-
ises, organization, and operations to reflect what had been
previously learned. Conceivably, many enterprises experi-
enced simultaneous extensive and intensive growth.
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Implications for the Futurfi
Mitchell Sviridoff once observed:
A city school system cannot achieve the highest
of education for all children unless
ways are found to relieve the schools of the
^tolerable pressures and burdens imposed uponthem by changes in social conditions over vrhichit has no control. This is to say that if a
city school system ignores any one critical
source of deterioration, it will become increas—
difxicult for it to devote the fullest
measure of its attention to the business of
challenging all children to achieve to the max-
imum of their ability. 22
To the extent that institutional change was necessary
and community action aroused an urban school system and its
companion public-serving institutions to recognize and react
to the truth of Sviridoff’s statement the Hew Haven reform
coalition was successful. Unquestionably the coalition, ergo
its strategy, is an example of how to introduce basic insti-
tutional change into an urban setting, an example of how to
allow the forces of critical social processes to alter re-
sponsibly a city’s educational and community seirvice struc-
ture. I-Iany cities have yet to begin to grapple with this most
common major urban problem. The Hew Haven experience may be
useful in this context: in part or whole it may be an exam-
ple of how to address multi-faceted problems collectively or
individually. And as an example it may provide just one "ade-
quate description of the change process to allow others to be-
gin to understand the high frequency of failure or the occa-
^^Community Progress, Inc., Community Action Program
Review (Hew Haven: Community Progress, Inc., 1965}, p. 23.
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2 "^
sional successes,"
In ijlie Iasi; analysis, it may simply "be an example of
hope.
23Sarason, Culture of the School
, p. 60.
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APPENDIX
SCHOOL-COMOTITY COimciLS
The Need For Counri-i'l c;
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Our schools represent only one kind of institution where
education takes place. Children also learn through their
daily experiences at home and in their community. Both the
people employed in the school system and those outside the
schools who are concerned with raising children must be made
aware of all these forces which work to educate children.
This awareness and understanding can be brought about through
continuous two-way communication between the people in the
community and the schools that serve them.
School-Community Councils can provide the means to bring
about this needed exchange of information, ideas and opinions.
Formation of School-Community Councils represents the begin-
ning of a systematic and effective means of learning from one
another. Merely establishing a council for each school will
not solve all educational problems, but, if undertaken with
earnestness and mutual trust, the councils may provide an op-
portunity for people who are concerned to work together toward
resolving their problems.
In order to establish two-way communication, the first
function of a School-Community Council is to listen to the
vievTpoints and concerns of people in all areas of the school
community. People's needs in the fields of health, human re-
lations, education, recreation, and well-being hre all inH
portant in determining the manner and content of school pro-
grams. The council can also provide an effective way for the
school to communicate its views and concerns to the community.
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E&cli School—Connii'uiii'ty Council can pla,y a. real and very im—
poriani pari in ihe educational system by advising on ques-
tions that arise and on courses of action to be considered.
Certainly in matters where the community's experience is most
substantial the councils can expect to play a major part.
Operation of The Councils
The all important function of each School-Community
Council is to consult with and advise the school's principal
on all matters of mutual interest. The principal remains re-
sponsible for the entire operation of his school (much as a
captain is responsible for his ship), however, the principal
is obliged to bring most school matters to his school's coun-
cil for discussion. He is also obligated to take the council's
views seriously into account when making decisions.
Following the initial election, councils will become self-
regulating by establishing bylaws for their own governance.
These bylaws must be compatible V7ith Federal, State, and City
statutes. It is expected that the material here which deals
with membership, terms of office, filling of vacancies, of-
ficers, and standing committees will be incorporated in the
bylaws. V/hen the bylaws for each school's council are adopted,
they will be reviewed by the Assistant Superintendent-Sup-
portive Services to make certain that they are in accord with
the requirements placed on the council. The council will
then operate under these rules until such time as the council
feels a revision is needed in order to better reflect com-
munity needs and experience.
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t council ni6iiilDei*s have an ohligaiion "to be
in close contact with the people in the area they v^ere elected
to represent. They must pass along appropriate information
from the council, and they must actively solicit the concerns
of all the people they represent in order to express their
views effectively at council meetings.
In an attempt to insure that everyone be heard, council
meetings should be announced in advance and open to the pub-
lic. Meetings must be conducted in accord vrith the council’s
bylaws. Minutes of each meeting must be kept and made avail-
able to the public on request.
Final authorities for most areas of school policy rests
with the city-wide Board of Education not only because State
law places the responsibility for management of the school
system on the Board, but to secure considerable advantages in
maintaining city-wide standards, coordinating services, pro-
moting economic efficiency, and providing guidance from
trained personnel experienced in the various fields of educa-
tion.
It shall be the policy of each School-Community Council
to;
Adhere to requirements set by State Law and City
Statutes
.
^Honor the City's obligations as stated in the vari-
ous labor contracts and other contracts to which
the City is a partner.
Work within the policy framework established by the
Board of Education.
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If a school’s council finds a law or a Board policy unworkable
or unacceptable, that council may present a recommendation
that a change be considered.
Membership Of The Councils
The following notes on the composition of the councils
may be modified later by the experience of each School-Comr-
munity Council and the needs of the community, but these will
serve for at least the first council to be elected in each
school.
It is intended that the categories listed vjill provide
representation for all facets of the school’s communities.
There are categories for school system employees, community
adults, and a category for students (in schools where they
are eligible for membership) . The topic on elections which
follows explains how representatives are chosen within these
categories.
There is just one general restriction on eligibility for
election to represent any category listed; a person may be a
member of only one School-Community Council at a time.
The structure proposed for the councils is as follows:
Elementary School (excluding community schools and schools
with 8 grades)
6 Adults living in, and elected by, the several geo-
graphical areas served by the school.
A majority of these adults must be parents of students
enrolled in the school.
3 Teachers on the school’s staff.
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1 Civil Service employee on the school's staff
(custodian or clerk).
1 Paraprofessional on the school's staff.
The principal, ex-officio.
Elementary (K--8) and Community Schools
8 Adults living in, and elected hy, the several geo-
graphic areas served by the school.
A majority of these adults must be parents of students
enrolled in the school.
6 Teachers on the school's staff.
6 Students currently enrolled in the school.
(applies in Middle Schools and K-8 schools; students
to be dra'vm from the upper grades in the case of K-8
schools)
.
2 Civil Service employees on the school's staff (to be
1 custodian and 1 clerk)
.
1 Paraprofessional on the school's staff.
The principal, ex-officio.
(Up to 2) Other administrators on the school's staff
(to be non—voting members of the council)
.
High Schools
12 Adults living in, and elected by, the several geo-
graphic areas served by the school.
A majority of these adults must be parents of students
enrolled ia the school.
6 Teachers on the school's staff.
6 Students currently enrolled in the school.
2 Civil Service employees on the school's staff
(to be
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1 custodian and 1 clerk)
.
1 Paraprofessional on the school's staff.
The principal, ex-officio.
(Up to 2) Other administrators on the school's staff
(to he non-voting members of the council)
.
These memberships figures are not permanently fixed.
If, after the election, the community representatives elected
to the school's first council feel more people are needed to
give adeq^uate and equal representation to all the districts
served by the school, they may nominate and elect additional
representatives to achieve this goal.
Any group which finds after the election that no one
representing that group was elected to the council, may peti-
tion the elected council for representation. The council may
reviev:, and accept or reject, any such application. If the
application is denied, the petitioners may appeal to the As-
sistant Superintendent-Supportive Services.
If there is an insufficient number of candidates, or
none at all, to represent a category (e.g. Civil Service,
paraprofessional, etc.) these council seats will remain vacant
until the next election.
Election to Council
Community representatives (parents and other adults)
vfill be nominated and elected according to geographic dis-
tricts served by each school. Information on the boundaries
of the districts within each school's area is available at
the school's office.
Teacher representatives will be nominated and elected by
147
the faculty of the school. Any full-time teacher on the
school's staff is eligible. An itinerant teacher (one who
works in more than one school) is eligible for election to
the council of any school in which he spends more than 50%
of his time.
Student representatives (in K-8 Elementary, middle and
hi^ Schools) will be nominated and elected by the student
body. The procedure for nomination and election will be de-
termined by the school's Student Council or Student Congress
where one exists. V/here there is no such organization, the
principal will be responsible for working out the procedure
with the students. V/hatever the method the student repre-
sentatives should, like the community representatives, be
dravm. from the various geographic districts defined for their
school.
The procedure for nomination and election of the other
school personnel specified for the council will be supervised
by the principal.
Terms of Council Membership
Generally, representatives will be elected to a two-year
term. They may — if still eligible and if nominated and
elected — serve one additional two-year term.
It is desirable to provide for continuity in future
council operations by arranging that only one-half of the
council seats be up for election in any given year. In order
to set these staggered terms it will be necessary that some
members elected to the first council serve only a one-year
term. V/ho will serve these one-year terms will be determined
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by a lot after the first election.
Council membership will be automatically terminated at
any time if the following occurs:
Student representative - 1. when he graduates, 2. if he
transfers to another school, 3. if he leaves school for any
other reason.
Parent representative - 1 . when his child (children)
graduate, 2. when he moves and his child is transferred to an-
other school, 3. when his child leaves school for any other
reason. V/hen a parent representative moves to another geo-
graphic area (served by the same school, but other than the
area that elected him to the council) he may continue to the
end of his regular term.
Teacher representative - 1 . if he is transferred to an-
other school, 2. if he becomes an administrator, 3. if he re-
tires or otherwise leaves the school system.
Civil Service or paraprofessional representatives - 1 . if
they transfer to another school, 2. if they leave the school
system.
The principal is a continuing member of the council as
long as he is principal, no matter how many years he may serve.
Filling Vacancies On The Council
When a vacancy occurs on the council (due to resignation,
moving out of the school area, etc.) the vacancy will be
fjj_led by a representative elected by a vote of the remaining
council members. The replacement must represent the same
constituency as the person leaving - i.e. a parent from
one
district must be replaced by a parent from the same
district,
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a teacher must replace a teacher, etc.
Q^t'icers Of The Council
The elected council will, as its first official act
after the annual elections, elect from its o\m members: a
Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, and a Treasurer (or a
Secretary-Treasurer, if it prefers)
.
Standing Committees Of The Council
The objectives of the council will best be achieved
through standing committees which will serve as the work
groups of the council. Those committees recommended here
should be created to insure that the major areas of the coun-
cil’s concern will be given full attention. Other standing
committees may be established by the council as future experi-
ence may dictate.
Council members are to be chosen to be members of the
standing committees. If possible, each council member should
be assigned to at least one committee. Duplicate membership
(that is, one person serving on two or more committees) should
be kept to a minimum.
Standing committees should meet at least twice a month.
Meetings may be opened to the public.
The principal, or another administrator he may designate,
is an ex-officio member of each standing committee.
Budget Committee
Purpose: To give advice to the principal in the de-
velopment of the school’s budget requests
vjhich will be forwarded to the central admin-
istration for approval.
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Members: 2 conmnmity representatives at least 1 of vhom
must be a school parent
1 teacher
1 student (in councils for middle and high
schools)
.
Method: This committee will study prior years’ budgets,
speak with school people and others about cur-
rent and future school needs. It will be in-
formed on procedures for school budgets, and
ways to indicate priorities.
It will determine what programs have proven
most effective in terms of cost and results
in past years.
After a budget proposal has been prepared by the princi-
pal, with the help of the committee, it will
be presented to the council for review and
discussion.
The principal must present the budget to the central ad-
ministration. If a majority of the council disagrees with
the budget presented, the council may present the majority
view to the Director - Administration/Supervision. Once ap-
proved by the Board of Education and the City of New Haven’s
Administration this budget becomes the authorized one for the
school.
Program Evaluation Committee
Purpose: To assist the principal in evaluating present
school programs in light of their success in
achieving previously identified objectives.
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Members: 5 community representatives at least 2 of whom
must be parents.
2 teachers
1 student (in councils for middle and high
schools)
Method: This committee will:
Continuously follow up existing programs
and projects. Submit at year's end a
written, objective evaluation including
suggestions for improvement.
This report to be:
Discussed with the principal
Sent to the school's Director-Administration/
Supervision and to the Assistant Superin-
tendent-Supportive Services.
Program and Curriculum Committee
Purpose: To consider and develop new educational
programs
.
Members: 3 community representatives at least 2 of whom
must be parents.
2 teachers
1 student (in high school councils)
Method: This committee must work closely with the
Program Evaluation Committee because of the
need to tie any new activity in with exist-
ing programs.
It must work closely with the Budget Committee
because of possible cost factors involved in
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changes or innovations. This committee should
make extensive use of available talent (e.g.
the PTA, teachers, department heads, subject
supervisors) in developing programs to meet
special needs of the school.
Council members are familiar with the cultural background
special interests, skills deficiencies and learning patterns
of the students. Teachers and supervisors are familiar v:ith
available materials and techniques. When these groups co-
ordinate their efforts new programs or projects can be worked
out jointly.
This committee must note that certain courses are re-
quired to be taught according to State Law. Also, the Board
of Education has the authority to approve, disapprove or mod-
ify any program taught.
Health Committee
Purpose: To promote a broader and deeper understanding
of school programs within and outside school;
to identify health needs related to school and
suggest resources for meeting them; to recom-
mend and support health services aimed at im-
proving students’ health.
Members; 3 community representatives at least 2 of whom
must be parents.
1 teacher
1 pupil personnel worker (e.g. guidance coun-
selor, social worker, paraprofessional)
2—4 students (2 in middle school, 4 in high
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schools)
1 school niirse
Method: The committee will:
Stimulate interest on the part of students
and parents in taking advantage of health
services offered in school. Identify stu-
dent health needs and evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of current programs in meeting
them.
Consider and recommend ways of making health
and safety programs more effective.
School Personnel Committee
Purpose: To consult with and advise the principal and
the Director of Personnel on hiring or appoint-
ing personnel to he assigned to the school.
Members: 3 community representatives of whom 2 must he
parents
.
2 teachers
1 student (middle and high school councils)
Method: This committee will:
Receive names of candidates for the vacant
teaching positions in the school from the
Director of Personnel after his initial
screening of applicants.
Recommend criteria for consideration in
hiring non-professional personnel.
Stimulate the interest of the community in
applying for all sorts of positions in the
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system as a way of aiding in recruiting
qualified people.
Participate in planning overall personnel
requirements. Assist in outlining training
courses for non-professional personnel.
Meet candidates for positions if it is pos-
sible to arrange for such meetings.
Send recommendations or evaluations of
candidates to the principal for his con-
sideration.
Share some responsibility for the selection
of their school’s administrator( s) by re-
viewing candidates recommended by the Super-
intendent, and forwarding the council’s
recommendation for choice to the Superinten-
dent.
Funds Available To The Councils
Each coimcil will control a specified amount of money
(not a part of the regular school budget) . These funds may
be used for projects or programs of special concern to the
school. The amount of money alloted will be determined on
the basis of student enrollment figures for each school and
will be included in the Board of Education budget proposal.
Relationship of Principal To Council
The principal is an ex-officio member of his school’s
council and of each of its standing committees. In schools
where allowance is made for other administrators on the coun-
cil, they, like the principal, will be non-voting members.
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The principal will keep the council informed on all
matters that affect, or may affect, the school. He will
actively solicit the council's help in working out solutions
to problems.
If a school's council finds one of the school's own
regulations or programs unacceptable or unworkable, the coun-
cil will request the principal to consider a change. On
those strictly internal matters the principal should give
serious consideration to the council's view and make the
change requested, if it is feasible.
The principal must explain in detail (within the re-
strictions imposed by confidential information and ethical
conduct) when he is unable to accept a council recommendation.
When a council's views differ strongly from those of the
principal, the council will have an opportunity to present
its vievf to the school's Director-Administration/Supervision.
A council may request the principal v/hen he disagrees
with the council's opinion to forv;ard the council's majority
opinion through the lines of organization to the system's
central administration.
It is expected that most questions and problems that
arise in the community will come up for discussion through
the council organization. However, there will be occasions
when problems will be brought directly to the principal by
persons v7ho are not members of the council. Vfhen this hap-
pens the principal must be as responsive to these complaints
or suggestions as he is to those discussed in council since
his role makes him accountable to all the people the school
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serves.
The close relationship that should exist between princi-
pal and council does not affect the principal’s responsibility
to his immediate superior for carrying out policies, proce-
dures and programs established for the whole school system.
The principal is not only responsible for the day-to-day as-
pects of the operation of his school, but he is also respon-
sible on a continuing, long-range basis for the successful
operation of his school.
Conclusion
The school system’s administration is convinced that
much can be accomplished to make the structure of education
fit students’ needs today and tomorrovz. This can only be done
through involving all the people affected by the school system
in a continuing two-way dialogue on shared concerns. A great
deal of time and effort has been devoted to consideration of
how to involve the people the school serves with the school
itself. The School-Community Council has been determined to
be the best means of bringing about this involvement. The
resources of the school system as well as the resources and
personnel of community organizations dedicated to this same
concept stands ready to help any new council organization.
The councils will be living and growing organizations adapt-
ing their bylaws and operations to meet needs as they develop
through experience. Each council vrill be evaluated continu-
ously to determine that it performs the valuable service that
it has the potential for, a service to both community and
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school. The Assistant Superintendent-Supportive Services
will appraise council operations and offer assistance to any
council to help it fill its vital role.

